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Poverty’s major cause is unemployment. In the unlikely event that unemployment is 
halved by 2014, there will still be millions of people in South Africa in workerless 
households. The only way to address this is to develop a truly comprehensive social 
protection system. This paper looks at aspects of the way government responds to claims 
that are made, chiefl y by academics, about poverty and unemployment. Bearers of good 
tidings are effusively welcomed while critics are dismissed with a hail of numbers about 
the achievements, actual or projected, of the democratic government.
Offi cial statistics on poverty and unemployment enjoy little favour among senior politicians 
and civil servants. ‘Unoffi cial’ poverty and unemployment statistics, by contrast, are seized 
upon with enthusiasm if they contradict the gloomy picture created by numbers that 
suggest (with monotonous regularity) that improvements in the lives of the poor are not 
happening fast enough. The fi rst part of the paper explores possible explanations of 
government’s extreme sensitivity to criticism.
The second part of the paper looks at an old chestnut, the repeated claim by government 
that the severity of the unemployment problem has (in part?) to do with the ‘fact’ that 
the number of economically active people has grown faster than the number of working 
age people. The claim is false, and may readily be seen to be so. It sits awkwardly with 
the equally frequently repeated claim that ‘we are on target to halve unemployment’. 
The usefulness of the (false) claim is presumably the sympathy and understanding it 
evokes for the plight of a government faced, in its attempts to solve an immensely diffi cult 
problem, by continually moving goalposts.
The third part of the paper looks briefl y at the van der Berg et al (2005) poverty reduction 
estimates for the period 2000-2004 (they have the headcount falling from 18.5 to 15.4 
million), before reproducing my estimates for the period 2001-2004 (the headcount falls 
from about 19.5 to somewhere in the region of 18 million). Extracted from two recent 
papers (Meth 2006a and 2006b), a brief description of the way these fi gures have been 
constructed, including a discussion of the many data diffi culties faced in doing so, is 
offered. The van der Berg et al fi nding of a headcount fall of three million, said largely to 
be the result of massive expansion of the social grant system (and possible improved job 
creation) is argued to be dubious. My results suggest that the grants lifted an additional 
1.2-1.5 million people over the poverty line. They also suggest that job creation benefi ted 
the well-off rather than the poor. Figures from a paper by Burger and Yu (2006), two of 
van der Berg’s co-authors, suggest that earnings growth, the only other possible source of 
income for raising the poor out of poverty, cannot account for more than a trivial proportion 
of such movement out of poverty as did occur during the period.
Suggestions are offered for the proper academic conduct upon releasing contentious 
results into a highly-charged political debate.
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 1. Introduction
It can come as no surprise to anyone to hear that politicians and government offi cials 
are addicted to ‘good news’ about the effi cacy of the policies they devise and attempt 
to implement; to expect otherwise, would be naïve in the extreme. On the face of it, 
therefore, a paper devoted to the examination of such an addiction, would seem to hold 
out little promise of revealing anything new. Since, however, the reasons why good 
news is craved can vary from the despicable (attempts to justify bad policies pursued 
by unpopular governments) to the sad (good policies introduced by a sympathetic 
government succeeding but not receiving the recognition that is their due), there are more 
than ample grounds for delving into the stories behind particular cravings for good news. 
Accordingly, this paper attempts to understand the particular reasons for the South African 
government’s addiction to good news about its anti-poverty policies, and its policies to 
address unemployment. It does so by looking at the way that government communications 
experts impart a ‘spin’ to stories when the news they contain is not good enough.
Structural mass poverty has been the lot of most South Africans for a very long time; 
structural mass unemployment,
1
 its somewhat younger cousin, has had the country in its 
grip for almost three decades.2  Poverty among the majority of people in the country has 
been obvious for so long that even if the phenomenon did not attract the concentrated 
academic attention it deserved until the early 1980s (the Second Carnegie Conference 
in 1984 marks a turning point at which the trickle of research endeavours in the fi eld, 
turns into a fl ood), few would have thought it appropriate to deny poverty’s widespread 
existence. The history of the debate about unemployment is different. There was a time (in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s) when economists of a conservative (neo-classical) stripe 
denied the existence of ‘involuntary’ unemployment in South Africa, claiming that even if 
the ‘going wage’ was deplorably low, there was work for all who were prepared to accept 
1  Discussing conditions in the world more generally, Lal and Myint (1996, pp.34-35) observe that structural mass poverty, “for most 
of our history, has been the natural state of humanity.”  Eradicated in the advanced capitalist (and for a while, in the advanced
former socialist) countries by the two forces underpinning the capitalist ‘industrial’ revolution, the institutional changes noted
by Adam Smith, and the unleashing of the immense power of mineral raw materials, first recognised by Marx, the problem 
of structural mass poverty gave way, under certain adverse conditions, to mass structural unemployment. The devastating 
unemployment of the Great Depression that followed the crash of 1929 was ‘cured’ in many countries only by full employment 
associated with World War II. The stability and near-full employment of the post-war period, which encouraged the conceit that 
the business cycle had finally been vanquished, was shattered by the crisis of the late 70s and early 80s, which saw the re-
emergence of sustained high rates of unemployment in many advanced capitalist countries. For evidence of the unemployment 
crisis in the OECD countries, see Scharpf and Schmidt (2000), Vol. 1, Table A.4, p.341.
2 In October 1986 there were already more than one million unemployed Africans in South Africa excluding the so-called 
‘independent’ Bantustans. The unemployment rate for Africans in what was quaintly described as the ‘White areas’ of South 
Africa was 13 per cent, while in the ‘non-independent’ Bantustans, it had reportedly reached 28 per cent. Meth (1988, p.173)
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that wage. It may well have been the case that the reservation wage of some of the 
unemployed exceeded the going rate for some of the less pleasant jobs in the economy. 
That is unlikely to be the case now. If the Labour Force Surveys (LFS) are to be believed 
such folk constitute a tiny minority of the unemployed, the bulk of whom report, when 
asked why they did not work in the previous week reply that they cannot fi nd any work.3
Nowadays, it would be diffi cult to fi nd serious support for the view that unemployment 
is ‘voluntary’. Even though it is now widely accepted that South Africa’s unemployment 
and poverty problems are serious, there are still major disagreements about the extent 
of each. There are disagreements as well, about the causes of each, and the effects, 
positive or negative, of government policy on both poverty and unemployment.
Since much of the disagreement about the unemployment and poverty problems, stems 
either from government’s rejection of offi cial statistics (unemployment) or its over-hasty 
endorsement of reports of reductions in the poverty headcount, a way of starting to think 
systematically about government’s addiction to good news about its policies needs to be 
found. The approach adopted in this paper makes use of two aphorisms: one is Marx’s 
claim that: ‘If the essence and appearance of things directly coincided, all science would 
become superfl uous’. The other is that: ‘Justice must not only be done, it must also be 
seen to be done’.4
The essence of poverty, of course, is the lived experience of the poor. Appearance that 
obscures the nature of that essence, or that refl ects only a fraction of the essence, is 
probably what the casual onlooker sees.5  Social science may be thought of as the 
attempt to reduce the distorting and refracting effects of the medium that separates 
essence and appearance. Scientific analysis can never recreate essence – the 
3 In September 2004, the LFS found 722 000 people who said that they lacked the skills or qualifications required for the available
jobs, 231 000 who said that they had recently been retrenched, and 6.75 million people who reported that they could not find 
any work. Almost 44 per cent of these people were below the poverty line of R250 per capita in 2000 prices (R309 per person in 
2004 prices), while almost half of them were below a line of R400 per month (in 2004) prices. These poor people are unlikely to
be choosey about jobs – only 294 000 people reported not being able to find ‘suitable work’, where suitable is defined in terms of 
wage/salary, location or working conditions. Before September 2002, conservatives used to be able to argue that the unemployed 
were work-shy because most of them gave the ‘lack of suitable work’ as the reason for being unemployed. When the ‘cannot find 
any work’ response was introduced into the LFS, nearly all of them, as we see above, migrated from the ‘suitable work’ into the
‘cannot find any work’ category. Source:  Own calculations on September 2004 LFS data set. Earned incomes in households are 
adjusted by 100 per cent to allow for under-reporting. Income from all sources includes migrant remittances and all social grant
income. See Meth, 2006b.
4 The statement by Marx is either an aphorism (A pithy statement which contains a general truth), or a dictum (A formal 
pronouncement from an authoritative source. A short statement that expresses a general truth or principle). The statement about
justice is probably a maxim (A short, pithy statement expressing a general truth or rule of conduct). It could also possibly be a 
dictum. The richness (and imprecision?) of the English language leaves one a little breathless at this point.
5 The same could possibly be said of the analysis of a not-very-competent social commentator.
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simulacrum or representation that a systematic observer constructs when attempting to 
translate the experience of the poor into images that convey a general understanding of 
the problem, must always be less than satisfactory – the disjunction between appearance 
and essence can never wholly be dissolved.6 Moving from essence to systematic 
representation involves the creation and deployment of concepts adequate to the task. 
Disagreements over the extent and severity of poverty and unemployment in South Africa 
(and elsewhere) arise because of disagreements over the concepts themselves, and/or 
the way in which attempts have been made to measure the phenomena they represent. 
Disagreements arise as well, because of the ways in which the instruments (surveys) 
designed to measure these phenomena have been executed and/or interpreted.
In a country with a history like South Africa’s, the sheer scale of the unemployment and 
poverty problems adds to the urgency of the need to address them. It adds, as well, to the 
need to have it made known that government is succeeding in its efforts. Appeals to the 
patience of the poor on the grounds that eradicating poverty in South Africa is an immense 
undertaking,7 cannot continue to be made indefi nitely. The discontent which enduring 
deprivation exacerbates, is likely to fi nd expression in socio-pathology. Where discontent 
is widespread, there is always the potential for social unrest. Part of the reason why 
discontent among those who are poor and/or unemployed is so threatening is because 
of the unrest that may be unleashed when people who glimpse only the small part of the 
problem that is their daily life, meet others who share their predicament. This is one of 
reasons why it is important not only to succeed in the struggle against poverty, but also to 
make that success known far and wide. 
Doing justice (like addressing poverty), and having it seen that justice has been done, is 
a political process. Stung by a barrage of criticism, ranging from accusations of having 
surrendered to international capital’s neo-liberal agenda, to a frequently expressed dismay 
at the corruption and incompetence of the civil service, and to not infrequent outbursts of 
civil unrest, the country’s political elite needs constantly to be reassured that it has been 
successful in improving the lives of many of the poor, and that success in countering the 
6 To recognise the distinction between essence and appearance is to take but the first step in a scientific inquiry. The further one 
goes, the tougher it gets. Anyone who doubts this should sample something like Tony Lawson’s Economics and reality (1997), 
where they would be obliged to begin thinking about the unsynchronised nature of the three domains of reality, “… namely the 
empirical (experience and impression), the actual (actual events and states of affairs in addition to the empirical) and the real
(structures, powers, mechanisms and tendencies, in addition to actual events and experiences” (p.21, emphasis in original))
7 Placing the matter in perspective, South Africa’s GDP in 2004 was almost R1400 billion. My estimate of the poverty gap (the value
of the annual transfer that would have to be made each year) was about R40 billion in 2004, or less than three per cent of GDP 
(Meth, 2006b). The challenge is to design policies that would place that amount of additional purchasing power in the hands of 
the poor.
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continued suffering of the many millions still to be reached by policies intended to improve 
their wretched lives, will not be long in coming.
In this intensely charged climate, any suggestion that government is failing in its mission 
to solve the poverty and unemployment problems, is unlikely to be welcome. A recent 
incident, typical of its kind, illustrates the reception a claim of that sort is likely to receive. 
John Pilger’s book called Freedom Next Time, published a short while ago, is not terribly 
polite about South Africa’s achievements in the fi eld of poverty and inequality reduction. 
The book excited comment at the very highest level – no less a personage than the 
Minister of Finance saw fi t to respond to it. It is not the purpose of the present paper to 
consider what these two protagonists had to say,8 rather, it is to focus on three issues that 
arise out of another response to Pilger, this one by Joel Netshitenzhe, head of the policy 
unit in the Presidency. It appeared on the same page as Pilger’s response to the Minister 
of Finance in the Sunday Independent, under the headline “Voters do not share Pilger’s 
perception”. This has underneath it, a somewhat lurid strap that reads “Journalist has 
distorted facts to suit his ideology and fails to acknowledge the immense changes that 
have taken place since 1994”.9
Two of the issues arising out of the Netshitenzhe piece are empirical matters. The third 
issue, referred to briefl y above, is that of government’s propensity to clutch at straws in 
defence of its anti-poverty policy. One of the empirical matters concerns the relationship 
between unemployment and changes in the participation rate, and government’s 
persistent misinterpretation of the record, a question I have addressed a couple of times 
in the past (Meth, 2004; 2005). The other is about two sets of estimates of the progress of 
the struggle against poverty (van der Berg et al, 2005; Meth, 2006a and 2006b) currently 
doing the rounds.
For all the torrent of words spewed out by government on poverty, there is no coherent 
document that says – “this is what we believe the extent of the poverty problem to be 
and this is how we intend to tackle it. Oh! and by the way, here is our progress report for 
8 Pilger seems to have started the ball rolling with an article that appeared in the Sunday Independent of July 30 2006, under the 
heading “Reich is in the shadows, but still in control”. The Minister of Finance’s response, with the headline “Pilger loses the plot 
in quest for drama” appeared in the Sunday Independent of August 13 2006. Pilger’s reply to the Minister was run in the Sunday
Independent, August 20 2006 (“ ‘Moribund’ social spending is holding back the marginalised majority”).
9 Stated this way, it looks as though facts are being reported. The newspaper would have done its readers (and itself) a service if 
it had distanced itself from what is merely Netshitenzhe’s opinion. Similar considerations apply, of course, to the headline above
the Pilger piece on the same page.
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the past n years, with quantities adjusted for quality.”10  A plethora of poverty alleviation 
programmes, some generously funded, has achieved less than its potential. This can 
probably be ascribed, as Swilling et al note, to something that:
“… most economistic and reductionist analyses fail to address, 
namely the complex and challenging task of institutionalising 
developmental state institutions. Measuring inputs (expenditures) 
and outputs (delivery), bemoaning the impacts (rising poverty) 
and then blaming the macro-economy”, they continue, “ignores 
the quintessential message of institutional economics; namely 
that fi nancial fl ows are mediated by institutional transactions that 
are time bound, constrained by human capacity and costly. If 
these institutional arrangements are inappropriately confi gured 
and/or are rendered ineffective by dysfunctional power relations, 
inadequate capacity and/or corruption, expenditures will have 
limited impacts. It follows therefore, that spending more via 
dysfunctional institutions could result in qualitatively poorer 
outcomes than spending less via functional institutions.” (2005, 
p.4)
Attempting to demonstrate that the claims made in the statement cited above, are true 
would take us well beyond the limits of the present paper. In any case, the bucket loads 
of money slung into child support grants, much of which appears to have been on target, 
makes it highly unlikely that poverty worsened in the period after 2001. The goal here is 
more limited, namely, to show that the state, not content with the modest improvements in 
people’s welfare caused by the extensions to the social protection system, exaggerates 
the extent of the improvement. Obviously, to substantiate the claim that the South African 
government is addicted to good news, it is necessary to demonstrate that progress reports 
exaggerate actual achievement.
We begin with an examination of the conceptual status of the various claims made in 
the debate over poverty. After that, we glance at some of the forces acting on the South 
African state as it attempts to go about the business of formulating and implementing 
anti-poverty policy. The discussion on concepts, which will be used to open the 
10 The AsgiSA (Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa), does little to encourage the belief that those responsible
for drafting the programme have a real understanding of how difficult it is to ‘share’ the benefits of economic growth. The 
programmes in the AsgiSA talk of hundreds of thousands when they should talk of millions.
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proceedings, begins with a consideration of the distinction between ‘facts’ and ‘artefacts’.11
A blurring12 of this distinction, it is argued, is, if not a necessary, then certainly a very 
useful part of the post-apartheid state’s defence against critics who claim that it is not 
making suffi cient progress in the war against poverty.
11 Artefact:  Something observed in a scientific investigation that is not naturally present but occurs as a result of the investigative 
procedure. (Oxford English Dictionary)  Reversion to the authority of the dictionary here should be seen for what it is – the 
uncertainty of one who works with words, of precisely what certain words actually mean, as opposed to what one thought they 
meant (hence the brief exploration above of the nuances of aphorism, maxim and dictum).
12 Writing is fun. Rereading the sentence containing the verb ‘blur’, it occurred to me that it was necessary to specify whether
‘blurring’ was viewed an act of omission, or one of commission. The Oxford English Dictionary says that ‘blur’ is “make or become 
unclear or less distinct”, thus allowing for both possibilities. Since it is unlikely that government spokespersons even make a
distinction between fact and artefact, the sin must be one of omission.
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 2. ‘Facts’, Artefacts and Anti-Poverty Policy
That Netshitenzhe fi nds Pilger’s views disagreeable (as indeed they are) is clear. In his 
response Netshitenzhe considers ‘invective’, and ‘rubbishing’ or ‘fl aying’ Pilger’s work. 
Instead of indulging himself in any of these relatively unproductive pursuits, he declares 
his intention of tackling Pilger on the ‘facts’. Acknowledging Pilger’s right to hold contrary 
views, he says:
“There is nothing wrong in holding such views. The problem 
is when facts are distorted to argue a profoundly ideological 
predisposition.”
Consistent with this approach, most of the remainder of the Netshitenzhe piece is devoted 
to an examination of “Pilger’s assertions on just three issues: poverty, the social wage and 
unemployment.”  Proceeding in calm and measured tone, he unrolls a series of ‘facts’ in 
support of his argument that:
“… the problem with his [Pilger’s] treatise is that he gets the facts 
wrong, and very wrong. Quite clearly, moving from his ideological 
standpoint, Pilger set out to fi nd a democratic revolution betrayed, 
and he found it.”
The piece ends as politely13 as it began, with a: “… what we do request from him [Pilger] 
is: the facts, next time!”14 (Sunday Independent of August 20 2006).
What we have here is a classic case of an individual seeing the mote in someone 
else’s eye while missing the beam in their own. Netshitenzhe’s ‘examination of Pilger’s 
assertions’ is a mixture of facts, (selected) artefacts and unsupported assertions. It is 
important to distinguish between them.
13 Pilger does not regard Netshitenzhe’s piece as polite. In his reply to Netshitenzhe (“ANC government has yet to free citizens from 
fear of poverty”, Sunday Independent, September 10 2006) Pilger says that Netshitenzhe “resorts to ridiculous abuse” 
14 The comrade Netshitenzhe is much enamoured of facts. In the Background chapter of A nation in the making, (of which work 
he, if not the author, is certainly one of the parents) one finds the following statement:  “The methodology used in this analysis is 
premised primarily on facts and figures. In this regard, the document avoids the temptation to allow a priori prejudices and beliefs 
to sully an objective appraisal of social dynamics, with the hope – and, the conviction – that the facts will speak for themselves.”
(2006, p.8)
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When the Department of Social Development says that it has paid out 4 309 772 million 
child support grants in the month of April 2004, the statement may (potentially) be 
verifi ed by means of the paper trail in its wake (the relevant administrative records). If, 
after, auditing, these records are found to have been properly constructed, we are on 
reasonably safe grounds if we describe the claim by the department to have made that 
many payments as a fact.
15
As soon, however, as anyone ventures into the interpretation of what such facts might 
mean for poverty, they exchange the security of the verifiable for uncertainty of the 
artefact. It were a good thing if everyone recognised that results pulled out of survey 
data by social scientists are not ‘facts’. They are artefacts, which may, if they are well 
constructed, allow glimpses of a complex reality.
When a social scientist says, as I do below, that the child support grants raised such and 
such a number of people out of poverty, that is an artefact.16  Its ‘truth’, if it embodies any, 
depends on many other factors, starting with the concept of poverty, and proceeding 
through such questions as to whether or not the survey from which it is drawn has been 
competently designed and administered, and whether or not respondents have been 
truthful. Finally, the survey results have to be raised to a population total, so the ‘truth’ of 
the statement depends as well on whether population fi gures are correct.
Sliding from the insecurity of artefact into unsupported (or barely supported) assertion, 
Netshitenzhe proclaims that:
“… [we] are on course to meet – the target of halving unemployment 
and poverty by 2014.”
Extrapolated from artefacts, some of which are given in his ‘examination of Pilger’s 
assertions’, neither claim is supported by the alternative interpretations of South African 
reality offered below.
15 Henceforth, when this word is used without scare commas it will refer to (potentially) verifiable statements of the type used in the 
illustration.
16 Strung together in a sequence, artefacts are used to create interpretations. Sometimes the rigour or otherwise of such constructions
can be ascertained using, for example, statistical tests. Much of the time, however, competing interpretations of the world can be 
created from the same facts and artefacts. The major disagreements between economists (the paradigms to which they belong) 
are one result. See Cole, Cameron and Edwards (1991) or Part 1 of Byrne (1999) for an exposition of these disagreements. The 
discussion by Lal and Myint (1996) of ‘forensic story-telling’ provides a good introduction to the difficulties of “choosing amongst
a number of competing stories the one which fits the ‘facts’ better than another” (p.5, scare commas in original).
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Careful readers of the original article will also note that Netshitenzhe engages in selective 
use of the artefacts in his two primary sources, van der Berg et al (2005) on poverty, and 
Bhorat et al (2006) on the social wage.17  So, not only does Netshitenzhe not follow his 
own advice and stick to the facts, he also does not draw reader’s attention to artefacts in 
his chosen sources that take the shine off his glowing presentation of his government’s 
achievements.
The question is: why does government’s most senior spokesperson, outside of Cabinet, 
fi nd it necessary to offer evidence of progress which he knows to be contested, and which 
he must know, will be criticised when it is used?  Before setting out to fi nd an answer to 
this question, it is as well to acknowledge that any explanations offered will, of necessity, 
be both speculative and fragmentary – it is impossible to tell the whole story.
The quest begins with a consideration of one of the ways the ANC in government 
responds to criticism. It is clear that certain criticisms strike a raw nerve, exciting what 
may seem to onlookers, a disproportionately vigorous response. One of these criticisms, 
which Pilger makes,18 is that the policies of ANC in government are ‘neo-liberal’.
For critics, the use of labels can be economical, insofar as they make it possible to invoke, 
with admirable brevity, a response to a web of policy measures. Using labels against the 
wielders of power is also satisfying, especially if the labels are a reasonably accurate 
description of the conduct in question. Adopted as political slogans, labels can help to 
create countervailing power. The neat label of neo-liberal, while capturing aspects of the 
reality of South African economic and social policy, is too limiting, however, to be used 
exclusively to describe a complex, messy politics. As Seekings (2002) has pointed out: 
“… the democratic state inherited a highly redistributive budget from the late apartheid 
state in 1994” (p.5). To describe all the steps taken since then to address the conditions of 
the poor (regardless of their success) as ‘neo-liberal’ is not useful. 
17 Netshitenzhe mines Bhorat et al piece for the most spectacular-sounding achievements in the asset provision field. He fails to 
mention their finding that asset poverty reduction appears to have been more rapid between 1993 and 1999 than it was between 
1999 and 2004. Nor does he mention their conclusion that the relative headcount reduction in the bottom decile was much 
lower than that higher up the distribution (2006, p.33). Netshitenzhe also does not draw the reader’s attention to the continuing
“marginalisation of poor African women living in rural areas” where Bhorat et al discover the asset poverty headcount rates in 
2004 to have been above those in 1993 (2006, p.31).
18 Pilger’s closing argument in his response to Minister Manuel in the article “ ‘Moribund’ social spending is holding back the
marginalised majority”, Sunday Independent, August 20 2006, says that: “It is a fact, alas, that Manuel has opted for neo-liberal 
growth strategy which is ideological, and that real growth that would benefit the majority has been anaemic. By any measure, it is 
a false strategy in the war against poverty and indignity. The majority of South Africans, who saw off apartheid, deserve better.”
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The recent research report into government’s approaches to poverty and development 
policy (referred to above) by Swilling et al (2005), argues that the South African state has 
followed neither “the classic neo-liberal state model, nor the developmental state model” 
(p.16). They try to make sense of the messiness of policy by focusing on the search (by 
government) for the ‘elusive developmental state’ during the fi rst democratic decade, 
and into the second, where the search intensifi es (2005, p.6). Parts of their analysis 
seem facile,19 but they are certainly no apologists for the state. In any case, one need not 
swallow their whole analytical apparatus. To the uninitiated, the ‘developmental state’ may 
sound cuddly. For those without knowledge of the forebears of this state form Swilling et
al spell out the characteristics of the ‘classic developmental state’. It has the “following 
elements:
• a ‘determined developmental elite’ committed to the modernisation project; 
‘relative autonomy’ from major capitalist economic interests who are always 
keen to capture the state;
• ‘a powerful, competent and insulated economic bureaucracy’ that enjoys 
the highest possible political support but operates without too much political 
interference;
• a ‘weak and subordinated civil society’ which means there are no rival centres 
of alternative policy formation;
• the ‘effective management of non-state economic interests’ via formal structured 
compacts, incentives and penalties; and
• accessible and usable institutions of ‘repression, legitimacy and 
performance’ ”20
In an era in South Africa where the discourse of policy formation was generously sprinkled 
with calls for ‘transparency’ among ‘stakeholders’ in finding the ‘way forward’, open 
acknowledgement of a desire to see the third of these preconditions met would not have 
19 For example, where they speculate on the possibility that black economic empowerment (BEE) and broad-based black economic 
empowerment (BBBEE or BBEE) “… will manage to break white control of investment decision-making quickly enough to ensure 
that private sector investment levels climb back up over the 15 per cent of GDP mark” (Swilling et al, 2005, p.74). No reasons are 
offered as to why black capitalist behaviour should differ from white.
20 The authors are citing Leftwich, 1995, pp.400-406. See Swilling et al (2005, pp.8-9).
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been politically advisable. The preferred kind of developmental state (at least in public 
discourse) would have been what Swilling et al term the ‘pragmatic’ developmental state. 
Such a model would:
“… look for a leading developmental role for the state (with a 
focus on human capacity, knowledge and skills), but via creative 
and complex partnerships with non-state actors (especially 
the ethical and responsible wings of the corporate sector), and 
with civil society formations rooted in poor and working class 
communities in particular.” (2005, p.15)
This vision may (or may not) have been in the minds of those thinking about development 
policy in the fi rst development decade, but, argue Swilling et al:
“… there is a lot of evidence that key thinkers in the South African 
state who are leading the post-2004 ‘developmental state’ 
perspective are using a ‘classic developmental state’ model.” 
(2005, p.15)
Whatever the case, the fl edgling state could not match word and deed. As Swilling et al
observe:
“Despite aspirations to be a developmental state, the necessary 
capacity for purposive, decisive and autonomous policy 
coordination was not successful prior to 2004, despite various 
attempts.”  (2005, p.16).
The reality was one of a desperate scurrying to fill posts, write reports and compile 
budgets, forcing many:
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“… progressives in government to make a trade-off between no 
progress in achieving broadly defi ned transformation goals, and 
achievable more narrowly defi ned short term strategic advances.”  
(2005, pp.16-17)
Their conclusion on the upshot of this ‘muddling through’ is worth citing at length:
“ ‘Policy choices’ during the fi rst decade of democracy in South 
Africa”, they argue, “were based on what was invariably an 
imperfect and incomplete reading of a complex reality (including 
the balance of class forces), after which choices were made 
under extreme time pressures and developed their own relatively 
autonomous momentum as they got ‘sold’ to many diverse 
constituencies to mean different things – hence the (suspect and 
dangerous) assumption that the more bland a policy document 
was, the wider the support base would be. What often started off 
as a half-baked idea at a pressurised meeting must suddenly be 
packaged by desperate (and quite often ignorant) political leaders 
to win stakeholder support by government offi cials and advisors 
who were often plagued by doubt and / or shallow mandates. 
But often it was too late to reverse the process and all that could 
be done was to pretend that this was all part of a well-conceived 
plan.” (Swilling et al, 2005, p.18)
This, of course, is only a set of generalisations (hypotheses) about the way in which policy 
formation took place in South Africa’s fi rst decade of democracy.21  As far as aspects of 
anti-poverty policy are concerned, it has about it, the ring of truth. Clearly, however, it 
does not apply to all policy. Equally clearly, it alone cannot explain the shape of the policy 
whose results Netshitenzhe seeks so vigorously to defend. It is merely one part of the 
story, another part of which is related by Friedman (2006), one which is brought to mind 
by the following statement from the Netshitenzhe piece:
21 Among the more obvious candidates for the award of the title of most ‘half-baked’ policy is the Expanded Public Works 
Programme (EPWP), in its guise as filler of the chasm in the social protection system, said chasm being the absence of any 
other social protection for all people of working age not protected by the provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Act. As a 
scheme for providing some small number of the unemployed with employment while at the same time creating infrastructure, it 
is commendable. As a means of bolstering social services, it is laudable. As a substitute for proper social security, it would be
laughable, were it not so pathetic.
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“Pilger”, he says, “concedes that his treatise is not meant to 
“suggest that people fail to recognise the achievements of the ANC 
government”. How else would he have been able to explain the 
growing expression of confi dence in government’s programmes 
during successive elections since 1994?” (Sunday Independent
August 20 2006)22
Netshitenzhe’s leap from increasing support for the ANC to a “growing expression of 
confidence in government’s programmes” may not be made without analysis of the 
reasons why voters voted the way they did (i.e., it is an unsupported assertion). Steven 
Friedman’s piece supplies an answer to the question Netshitenzhe asks of Pilger – and 
the answer is: identity voting. The argument is that (among some signifi cant sections 
of the population?) the “… chief rationale for voter choices is who voters believe they 
are and their assessment of which party can best provide a vehicle for who they are” 
(Friedman, 2006, p.5).23
There are both strengths and dangers to identity politics. One of the latter is the ease with 
which criticism of government is “dismissed as evidence of prejudice” (p.6). Friedman 
argues, however, that the constraints of identity politics are:
“… less remarkable than the fact that government politicians do 
continue to feel the need to respond to media criticism or the views 
of white-led civil society organizations. This is the consequence 
not of strategic calculation but of a particular racial dynamic. 
Postapartheid politics has been under-pinned by a theme, often 
not stated overtly, which is pervasive; whites expect a black 
government to fail and the leaders of that government know 
they do. It is, therefore, a key preoccupation of much of the new 
governing elite to demolish these assumptions by demonstrating 
that black people can govern an industrialized society with a 
complex market economy. Indeed, the central preoccupation of 
the post-1994 administrations has been to prove white racism 
wrong.” (Friedman, 2006, p.6)
22 This is translated, presumably by the newspaper’s sub-editors, into the headline “Voters do not share Pilger’s perception”.
23 For a discussion of the political economy of identity voting in South Africa, see MacDonald, 2006, Ch.7.
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This preoccupation, Friedman argues, “… weakens the quality of democracy by 
prompting enthusiasm for technical and managerial solutions24 rather than for democratic 
broadening or deepening.” (p.6)
Although they approach the question from different angles, the arguments presented 
by Swilling et al (2005) on the one hand, and that offered by Friedman (2006) begin 
to converge around a story of a new elite, anxious to show that it will solve the poverty 
problem its way. The aspirant developmental state that they lead lacks, however, some 
of the key elements of the classic developmental state, necessary to solve the poverty 
problem by ‘technical and managerial’ means. Not only is its “ ‘relative autonomy’ from 
major capitalist economic interests who are always keen to capture the state” limited, it 
also does not dispose of a ‘a powerful, competent and insulated economic bureaucracy’. 
One consequence is the attempted implementation of ‘half-baked’ anti-poverty policies.
Organisations representing the poor, although vociferous, are not able to ensure that 
their concerns are heard, with suffi cient clarity, by the elite. As Friedman points out:
“… many voters do not enjoy the resources that would enable 
them to organize to be heard in the public policy debate between 
elections. Their participation is largely limited to expressing their 
identities in periodic ballots. Because the poor – about two-fi fths 
of the society – are not heard, their experiences and concerns 
cannot translate into effective policy. This ensures that they 
remain mired in poverty and excluded, in a continuing vicious 
cycle, because participation is largely limited to those with the 
means to organize.” (Friedman, 2006, p.4).
To defend election campaign rhetoric like the ANC’s 2004 manifesto “A people’s contract 
to create work and fi ght poverty”, government must needs be selective in its use of 
such information as is available. Since much of it is critical of government’s attempts 
24 Swilling et al make the point that under the stressful conditions of the first decade of policymaking, “many discourses were 
adopted from international experiences heavily influenced by the interests of donors who funded study tours (eagerly seized by 
overworked officials needing a welcome break from the office to think and reflect), and technical advisors who tended to frame 
the questions in the language of the day (what Stiglitz has called the ‘roaring nineties’), namely a kind of technocratic neo-
liberalism devoid of liberalism’s own original moral humanism and unsubstantiated by a rigorous theory of justice” (2005, p.17).
As an example, government enthusiasm over public works, even if it does not have its origins in World Bank proselytising about 
the wonders of what it called ‘workfare’ as the preferred form of social security in developing countries, was probably positively
influenced by the Bank’s viewpoint (see World Bank, 2001, pp.155-156 and 167).
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to address poverty, an adherence to the principle of audi alteram partem (hear the other 
side) could undermine an otherwise plausible account. It is for this reason, I suspect, that 
Netshitenzhe uses the poverty fi gures published by van der Berg et al (2005), rather than 
the much less optimistic fi gures I have produced (Meth, 2006a).25  In short, to defend the 
barely defensible, Netshitenzhe is obliged to resort to selective presentation of facts and 
artefacts; to unsupported assertion; and where unemployment is concerned, as we shall 
see below, to misinterpretation of (dubious) artefacts.
As almost everybody recognises, the ANC government deserves praise for a number 
of very important achievements. It is not backward about coming forward to hear these 
praises sung. More is the pity then, that its appetite for praise is not matched by an 
ability to accept criticism for the failures over which it has presided. High on the list of 
these is the failure to devote suffi cient resources to the task of monitoring its attempts at 
redressing poverty. Government support for research into poverty and inequality, South 
Africa’s most pressing problems, is miserly.
Government needs to summon up the courage and the humility to face its diverse 
critics, without recourse to routine defensiveness of the sort displayed by Netshitenzhe 
in his response to Pilger. From all walks of life in South Africa, these critics express 
their dismay with perceived policy failures. They do so in a wide variety of ways, from 
violent demonstration to econometrics-heavy scholarly work. It needs to be recognised 
that many of the whites who engage critically, do so not with the expectation that the 
black government will fail, but with the profound hope that it will succeed. Believing, as 
Friedman argues, that the voices of the poor are inaudible (or if audible, are so only 
through a fi ltering system that removes undesirable ‘noise’), they throw their energies into 
creating the artefacts and speculations that approximate the voices of the poor. Aware 
that this is not the same as the authentic voices themselves, they urge government to be 
less dogmatic, less convinced of its superior knowledge, as it goes about the business of 
policy formation and implementation.
What some of the authentic voices articulate on occasion, does not make for pleasant 
listening. Lacking the capacity for sustained protest on a systematic (and possibly more 
orderly) basis, communities or relatively small groups of individuals within communities, 
25  Netshitenzhe may not have been aware of the existence of my estimates. Senior officials from the Presidency, however, certainly
were. Two of them were present at a workshop held in the HSRC offices in Pretoria on 17th February 2006, at which our respective 
results and methodologies were aired and critically evaluated by Professors Lam (my work) and Leibbrandt (that of van der Berg 
et al). Neither of the sets of estimates on offer was accepted by the workshop participants as definitive.
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respond to continuing deprivation with protests that frequently turn violent. An upsurge 
of these incidents in recent times suggests that the patience and restraint shown hitherto 
by the poor may be giving way to greater activism.26  This activism, around issues such 
as “lack of housing and sanitation, electricity and water cutoffs” has seen communities 
rejecting attempts by political leadership (local and national) to lower social tempers.27
Children are occasionally at the forefront of such actions. A particularly ghastly incident 
of this sort occurred in August 2004. A report under the headline “Twenty children shot 
in Harrismith protest” described how 4 500 children, protesting about service delivery, 
streamed onto the national highway, leaving the police, according to a spokesperson, 
with no alternative other than shotgun pellets to disperse them.28  Incidents of this type 
are, thankfully, relatively rare – the bulk of the protest action seen in recent years in South 
Africa, appears mainly to involve adults (or, at least, children do not feature prominently in 
the reports).
It is interesting that Netshitenzhe, in his response to Pilger, chose to ‘prove’ the ANC’s 
continuing, indeed growing popularity among the population, by reference to election 
outcomes. If he had chosen instead, to use the results on “The views of the public” 
in Chapter 4 of the Ten Year Review (PCAS, 2003, pp.91-95), he would have found 
the going a little harder. Presenting results from the Institute for Democracy in South 
Africa’s (Idasa) Afrobarometer, and from Markinor (a private-sector marketing information 
organisation that conducts opinion polls), the Review celebrates a general improvement 
26 A list of protest actions, drawn from just one newspaper, the Weekly Mail & Guardian, gives a flavour of the mood among 
sections of the poor. Service delivery failures feature prominently among the causes of the disturbances. “March draws attention
to plight of homeless”, Hila Bouzaglou, 20 September 2006. “Khutsong: ‘The ANC sold us’ ”, 22 February 2006. The report says 
that: “The cause of unrest is economic. People are fed up waiting for jobs and basic services such as electricity, clean water 
and sanitation.”  “Eleven arrested in North West service protest”, 23 January 2006. “Three injured in southern Cape service 
protest”, 16 January 2006. In this instance: “police threw stun grenades and fired rubber bullets at protesting Power Town informal
settlement residents”. “A winter of discontent”, Marianne Merten, 27 May 2005. This article contains a catalogue of the incidents
in the first five months of the year. Although the list of incidents in the Merten article is long, President Mbeki was still able to 
argue, and not implausibly, that as yet, “urban unrest over service delivery” has not yet reached the point that would suggest 
that the country is threatened by the “centrifugal tensions” that have caused collapse elsewhere in Africa. He claimed further 
that neither these demonstrations nor minority mobilisation present “any immediate danger to our democracy” (“Urban unrest 
could lead to conflict, says Mbeki” (Mail & Guardian, 25 May 2005, online version).    
Growing community assertiveness is not entirely unexpected. Writing a few years ago, Good (2001, p.47) pointed out “the extent 
of the demobilization in South Africa should not be exaggerated” in spite of the “… systematic (and astonishingly rapid) process
of political demobilization… ” that took place after 1994, which left many of the institutions of civil society that represent the poor 
in a weak state. Some commentators are quite upbeat about the potential of groups representing the interests of the poor. See 
for example, Desai (2002), or the article by Raj Patel and Richard Pithouse, that appeared in Mail & Guardian May 20 to 26 2005 
(pp.30-31) under the headline “Epidemic of rational behaviour”.
27 It remains to be seen whether steps taken by the likes of  the Housing Minister to address the frustrations of the unhoused and
poorly-housed can succeed before “other festering problems adding to the explosive mix” result in major confrontations. The 
article from which these comments are drawn, by Linda Ensor, appeared under the headline “Protests signal that the patience of 
SA’s poor is wearing thin” in Business Day, 31 May 2005, online version.
28 See Weekly Mail & Guardian, online edition, 30 August 2004.
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in views (and not unreasonably so), but acknowledges the persistence of some severe 
problems. The Review says that:
“… the overwhelming majority felt that unemployment was the 
major challenge for the next decade, followed by addressing 
health and crime problems. Signifi cantly, poverty and the provision 
of services were ranked as lesser challenges in the next decade.” 
(PCAS, 2003, pp.94-95)
Public opinion, as is well known, can be fi ckle. It is certainly diffi cult to ascertain with 
reliability (pollsters regularly forecast election results incorrectly). Not only that, some 
views, when reliably ascertained, are not always easy to understand. Does the relative 
lack of concern about poverty expressed above (obtained at a time when the reductions 
in poverty brought about by extension to the social grant system were barely noticeable) 
mean that people have subsumed poverty into lack of employment, reasoning that if only 
they could obtain work, poverty would not be a problem?  The Ten Year Review shows 
signifi cantly reduced concern over education and health services in South Africa. Indeed, 
when one delves into the General Household Surveys, the 2005 GHS, for example, one 
discovers that the levels of satisfaction reported after attendance at a health facility (public 
or private), were very high (88 per cent were either very satisfi ed or somewhat satisfi ed). 
This holds even among the very poor, most of whom would have used the public health 
system, parts of which are notorious for their appalling service. The rating ‘very satisfi ed’ 
was lowest among the poor (about 62-69 per cent). It rises as income does, to about 87-
88 per cent among the moderately well-off (monthly per capita expenditure in excess 
of R1200 per month), then falls to about 73 per cent among those spending more than 
R10 000 per capita per month.29  Presumably, the very well-off are more demanding, while 
many of the very poor do not receive good treatment.30
Reference has been made above to Netshitenzhe’s use of the flattering parts of the 
Bhorat et al (2006) paper of shifts in access to services and assets. A less fl attering part 
of the story is told, not by Bhorat et al, but by estimates of what it is the poor fi nd to be 
unsatisfactory about service (or asset delivery). To illustrate, we turn to the education and 
29 Source:  Own calculations from GHS 2005 data set
30 Glennerster and Hills ask why, despite “… improved educational outcomes, improved housing standards, better performance by 
the National Health Service, more redistribution towards the poor” in the UK, “… there is so much dissatisfaction with the state
of welfare?” (1998, p.2). The answer, rising consumer expectations (of high standards) caused by the fact that the non-welfare 
world has not stood still (rising real incomes). In short, an improvement in service delivery does not translate automatically into
an increase in approval ratings.
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health data in the 2005 GHS. First, some fi gures on problems at school. From a list of half 
a dozen problem areas identifi ed by the GHS, data on four of them have been extracted, 
by per capita monthly expenditure levels. A minority of scholars (learners in newspeak) 
report 4.9 million grievances about their school experience. These are listed in Table 1, 
which sorts the complainants into two categories. First are those in households where 
per capita expenditure was below the R319 per month. This is roughly R250 per capita 
per month in 2000 prices, the poverty line used in van der Berg et al (2005). The second 
category captures everyone below R412 per month, which is roughly R322 per month in 
2000 prices, the poverty line used in Hoogeveen and Özler (2004).31 These poverty lines 
are referred to as PL1 and PL2, respectively, in the table.
Lack of books (in July, when the school year begins in January or February?), followed by 
poor facilities, account for most of the problems faced by scholars. The number suffering 
poor teachers is, however, not trivial, and the number with no (or too few) teachers is less 
trivial still. The most striking, and probably least unexpected feature of the results is the 
preponderance of the poor among those experiencing problems at school. The fi gure 
of 4.9 million does not represent that number of different individuals, each experiencing 
one of the problems. Nevertheless, a very large number of different individuals (several 
million) is involved – half of them (2.44 million) reported one problem only. The largest 
number of shared problems (536 000) experience a lack of books, in facilities that are in 
bad condition. The next most common combination of problems was among the 389 000 
scholars, plagued by a lack of books and teachers. Apart from pointing to a fertile breeding 
ground in which resentment can transmute itself into a variety of social ailments, these 
results suggest that boasting about the pro-poor nature of service delivery is not wholly 
justifi ed.
31 In Meth (2006a), I checked to see that reported expenditure did not exceed reported income by more than one expenditure 
category. In all cases where expenditure was greater than income, expenditure was adjusted upwards to shift it into the same 
category as income. This crude imputation exercise, which I called ‘purging’ has not been performed here. The numbers of 
people counted above as suffering various inconveniences will, therefore, be overstated. A rough check of the numbers against 
per capita incomes suggests that the effect will not be excessive. Unfortunately, since the GHSs do not collect information on 
migrants, they too, understate poverty. To counteract this, the income figures used in this paper have been adjusted upwards so
that survey and national accounts income totals are roughly equal.
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Lack of books 1 988 000 2 116 000 2 405 000
Poor teaching 462 000 494 000 584 000
Facilities in bad condition 1 038 000 1 071 000 1 190 000
Lack of teachers 579 000 621 000 722 000
Total 4 067 000 4 302 000 4 901 000
Percentages below PL1 and PL2 83.0 87.8
Source: Own calculations using 2005 GHS data set.
Unlike school, where attendance is compulsory, people who are unwell are not obliged to 
seek medical help. During the reference month for the 2005 General Household Survey 
(June 2005), 5.9 million people who reported being ill or injured. They may be divided 
into those who sought attention (4.8 million people) and the remainder, who did not. The 
1.08 million people who did not receive medical attention, may be sub-divided into those 
who said that it was unnecessary to attend a medical facility (681 000 people), and those 
who needed medical attention but were unable to obtain it. Among this group of 392 000 
people, who, it may be assumed, deemed that they did want or need medical help, 83 000 
did not receive it because the nearest medical facility was too far away, and 208 000 
because it was too expensive.32  In other words, if the reference month was a typical 
month, then it is possible that during the year, about three million people would have been 
denied medical attention because they were too poor.
The quality of help they receive in public sector clinics varies enormously. Although the 
bulk of users report being satisfi ed, a large number of people experience problems. An 
indication of the type and extent of problems may be obtained from the GHSs. Table 2 
lists the numbers of individuals who reported experiencing one of four problems with the 
quality of service provided at public sector clinics during the reference month for the 2005 
GHS. They are divided once more into two groups, this time into the group individuals 
with per capita expenditure of less than R412 per month in 2005 prices (R322 in 2000 
prices, the possible lower bound of South Africa’s poverty critical range); and those with 
per capita incomes below R824 per month, a fi gure that is not much higher than the upper 
bound of R760 per month.
32 It is not clear why so many people report that care was too expensive.  As Blecher and Harrison point out, primary health care (at 
least) is free at point of service (2006, p.32).
DPRU Working Paper 07/123
               20





Facility not clean 24 400 39 000 104 400
Long wait 150 900 298 200 872 200
Drugs needed not available 60 100 121 000 329 800
Staff rude, uncaring, patient turned away 45 200 80 400 221 900
Total 280 600 538 600 1 528 300
Source: Estimated from 2005 GHS data set.
The number of people inconvenienced during the course of the year depends on two 
things; whether or not the fi gures are typical of any month in the year, and the frequency 
of visits of individuals who are inconvenienced. If the fi gures for the month of June 2005 
are typical for those of the year, then there would have been about 10 million episodes 
during the year where people were made to wait too long for medical attention. Likewise, 
there could have been about four million episodes in which people did not get the drugs 
they needed, and nearly three million episodes where people will have experienced 
rudeness or uncaring attitudes from staff, or having been turned away from the facility. 
Roughly one-third of all of these problems would have been experienced by poor people.
This account squares with the report by Blecher and Harrison that in primary health care 
(PHC) facilities, “quality of care is sometimes sub-optimal, public facilities often have 
long waiting times and primary care facilities tend to have few doctors” (2006, p.32). 
Comparisons between service provided in the private sector and public sector are stark: 
as opposed to the 46 per cent who complained about too long a wait at public sector 
clinics, about ten per cent of those who saw private doctors made a similar complaint. 
In public sector clinics, the necessary drugs were not available to about 18 per cent of 
patients; three per cent of those consulting a private doctor made the same complaint. 
Less than two per cent of those attended to by private doctors complained that staff were 
rude and uncaring, as opposed to the almost 12 per cent who made this complaint about 
service at public sector clinics.
The GHS does not ask people what service they would choose if income were not a 
constraint. It looks as though about 130 000 people with per capita incomes less than 
R412 per month chose to make the sacrifi ce involved in consulting a private doctor. This is 
close to half of the number (303 000) in similar circumstances who chose to use a public 
sector clinic. Voting with one’s feet when one is so poor is possibly the strongest criticism 
Sticking to the Facts:  Offi cial and Unoffi cial
Stories about Poverty and Unemployment in South Africa                               Charles Meth
              21
of the system that one can make. Despite the obvious progress in making health care 
available to more South Africans, especially among the poor, there apparently remains 
considerable scope for reduction of inequalities between the quality of publicly- and 
privately-provided health services.
Whenever a politician or senior civil servant feels the urge to boast about how far we 
have come since the bad old days (as undoubtedly in many respects we have) or, 
more worryingly, expresses a need to involve the intelligence services in a search for 
explanations of why the poor sometimes behave poorly, they would do well to consider 
the burdens discussed above, none of which their exalted status now allows them to 
experience any more.
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 3. Misunderstanding Unemployment
Repeated criticism of South Africa’s unemployment statistics suggests an unwillingness, 
on the part of government, to engage seriously with the problem. Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in the refusal by the Presidency to pay attention to the story told by those 
statistics. Instead, various offi cials in that august offi ce reproduce, at regular intervals, a 
story dreamed up to explain the growth in the number of unemployed. It surfaces once 
more in Netshitenzhe’s response to Pilger. In essence, the tale is that the number of 
unemployed has grown faster over the medium term (1997-2005, in the version below) 
than the number of employed because the participation rate (the total of those working or 
wanting to work divided by working age population) outstripped growth in the working age 
population.33 Netshitenzhe puts it this way:
“Since 2001, job creation has grown at the pace of 350 000 a                  
year.
For the period 1997 to 2005, the labour force participation rate 
(i.e. the ratio of economically active adults to the total working 
age population) increased from 45.3 percent to 56.5 percent. 
This refl ected a growth rate of more than 4.8 percent a year in the 
economically active population (from 11.4 million to 16.7 million) 
during a period in which the population growth rate was about 2 
percent a year.
Only part of the growth in the economically active sector can 
therefore be ascribed to population growth and the rest is a 
result of greater numbers of people, especially women, defi ning 
themselves as looking for work.”34 (Sunday Independent, August 
20 2006, emphasis added)
33 In addition to pointing out in person to senior Presidency officials, that this story is not true, I have, as noted above, also published 
three articles that show why it is wrong (Meth, 2004; 2005 and 2006c).
34 This (suspicious) statement is interesting, drawing attention, as it does, to the difference between the act of ‘defining oneself as 
looking for work’ (appearance) and actually being unemployed (essence).
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The sources of this story are the October Household Surveys for the period 1997-1999, 
and the Labour Force Surveys for the period from 2000 onwards. The relevant fi gures 
are reproduced in Tables 3, 4 and 5. Let us use the information they offer to deal with his 
interpretation of labour market developments. To be pedantic, job creation, on the basis 
of the LFS fi gures, was not 350 000 per annum in the period 2001-2005, it was about 
300 000.35  More importantly, though, Netshitenzhe could also have pointed out that by 
2005, according to the fi gures in Table 4, employment had recovered its 2000 level. End-
point selection to embellish a weak argument is not a good idea.36
Two factors contribute to the rapid rise in participation rates between 1996 and 1999 
visible in Table 3. One is an increase of 1.1 million in the number employed, 900 000 
of whom were in the informal economy. The other is the increases in the numbers of 
unemployed, 900 000 offi cial and 1.3 million expanded. Doubts have been expressed 
about the validity of both the increases in the numbers unemployed, and in the 
unprecedented increase in the size of the informal economy. Speculative reduction of 
employment and unemployment growth to more plausible fi gures signifi cantly reduces 
the gap between the growth rate of the working age population, and the growth rate of the 
economically active, mooted by government as one of the causes of rising unemployment.
35 From Statistical Releases P0210 of 26 September 2005 and 24 January 2006, one may estimate that formal sector employment 
increased by 141 000 per annum in the period 2000-2005, and by 193 000 per annum in the period 2001-2005. Corresponding 
figures for the informal economy, with agriculture removed because of its poor behaviour) were 86 000 and 124 000 respectively.
Totals, adjusted for changes in the numbers of domestic workers and the ‘unspecifieds’ were 160 000 and 291 000 respectively.
36 He could also have pointed out that all of the employment figures in Table 4 are suspect anyway (a quality not normally associated
with a ‘fact’), because they include the poorly-behaved agricultural employment estimates.
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Table 3:  Economic Activity, 1996-1999
Oct 1996 Oct 1997 Oct 1998 Oct 1999
Working age population (1000s) 24 700 25 200 25 800 26 300
No. employed (1000s) 9 300 9 300 9 400 10 400
Official unemployment
No. (1000s) 2 300 2 500 3 200 3 200
Rate (%) 19.3 21.0 25.2 23.3
Expanded unemployment
No. (1000s) 4 600 5 300 5 700 5 900
Rate (%) 33.0 36.0 37.5 36.2
Participation rate (%)
Official 46.7 46.6 48.8 51.5
Expanded 56.2 57.5 58.4 61.8
No. of economically active (1000s)
Official 11 600 11 700 12 600 13 600
Expanded 13 900 14 500 15 100 16 300
Source: P0317, 31 July 2000, Tables B and D
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Working age population (1000s) 27 900 28 200 28 600 29 000 29 400 29 700
No. employed (1000s) 12 300 11 200 11 300 11 500 11 700 12 400
Official unemployment
No. (1000s) 4 200 4 700 5 000 4 500 4 200 4 500
Rate (%) 25.4 29.4 30.4 28.0 26.2 26.7
Expanded unemployment
No. (1000s) 6 400 7 700 8 200 8 300 8 100 7 800
Rate (%) 34.3 40.6 41.9 41.8 41.0 38.8
Participation rate (%)
Official 59.0 56.3 56.9 54.8 53.8 56.5
Expanded 67.0 67.0 68.1 67.8 67.3 67.7
No. of economically active (1000s)
Official 16 400 15 900 16 300 15 900 15 800 16 800
Expanded 18 700 18 900 19 500 19 700 19 800 20 100
Source: P0210, 26 September 2005, various tables.
Apart from the questionable nature of the early results, one of the most important features 
of the Tables 3 and 4 is the unmistakably clear indication they give of the break in labour 
market statistics caused by the abandonment of the October Household Survey in 1999, 
and the introduction of the Labour Force Surveys, the fi rst of which was conducted in 
February 2000 (a pilot in 10 000 households). An appendix in the February 2001 LFS 
(Statistics South Africa 2001, pp.12-13) in the published results explains some of the 
differences in numbers, but stops a long way short of a reconciliation of the pre-2000 
numbers with their counterparts from 2000 onwards.
So obvious is this break that it is worth taking out the fi gures on either side of it, to see 
just how large some of the changes are. This is done in Table 5. Some large part of the 
increase in the number of economically active which Netshitenzhe thinks he detects in 
the numbers is pure statistical artefact, i.e., it did not occur. Employment in South Africa 
manifestly did not rise by 1.9 million between October 1999 and September 2000, nor did 
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the number of offi cially unemployed increase by one million. It is ridiculous to suggest that 
the offi cial participation rate could have jumped by 7.5 percentage points in a single year, 
or that the expanded rate could have risen by more than fi ve percentage points in the 
same period.
Table 5:  The Break in the Series between 1999 and 2000
Oct 1999 Sept 2000 Change 99-00
Working age population (1000s) 26 300 27 900 1 600
No. employed (1000s) 10 400 12 300 1 900
Official unemployment
No. (1000s) 3 200 4 200 1 000
Rate (%) 23.3 25.4 2.1
Expanded unemployment
No. (1000s) 5 900 6 400 500
Rate (%) 36.2 34.3 -1.9
Participation rate (%)
Official 51.5 59.0 7.5
Expanded 61.8 67.0 5.2
No. of economically active (1000s)
Official 13 600 16 400 2 800
Expanded 16 300 18 700 2 400
Source: Tables 3 and 4
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There have been a couple of attempts to construct a continuous labour market series for 
the period 1995-2004.37  No-one, however, can avoid the fact that the information required 
to bridge the gap does not exist.
Part of the problem lies with the estimates of the working age population. Year-on-year 
growth in Table 3 is about 500 000 a year, while the Table 4 fi gures suggest roughly 
400 000 a year. Whatever the exact number, it is clear that the leap from 26.3 million in 
1999 to 27.9 million did not occur.38  Nor did the economically active population increase 
from 11.4 million in 1997 to 16.7 million in 2005, as Netshitenzhe claims. It is possible 
that growth of the working age population averaged about 1.5 per cent over the period 
1997-2005. Growth of the economically active population could have been in the region 
of 2.0 per cent.39  Altering the end-year to 2004 causes this relationship to reverse, growth 
of the working age population remains near 1.5 per cent per annum, while growth of the 
economically active population falls to 1.3 per cent per annum. This is because 700 000 
new jobs, most of them in the informal economy, appeared in the year 2004-2005.40  That 
single fi gure is enough to distort outcomes signifi cantly.
It is time to call a halt to this nonsense – the fi gures not only do not say what Netshitenzhe 
says they do, they also do not bear out the predictions he makes. He claims, as we noted 
above, that government and its social partners are on target to halve unemployment 
(and poverty). Unless one accepts that it is appropriate to predict the future from a single 
year’s results, then as far as unemployment is concerned, there is no evidence to support 
his ‘halving’ prediction. His ‘analysis’ of the relationship between economic participation 
and unemployment sits awkwardly with his concluding remarks on the matter. Having 
delivered us of the numbers repeated above, he says that:
37 During the years that the Employment Dynamics Group, put together by Miriam Altman at the HSRC, met (roughly 2003-2005), the
question of the 1999-2000 break in the series arose on a number of occasions. Participants, among whom were representatives 
from the Presidency, could not agree on a satisfactory way of dealing with it.
38 The OHS figures are weighted by the 1996 Population Census, while the LFS figures are weighted by the 2001 Population Census.
Inter-censal figures have to be estimated from a model, the results of which exercise are subject to revision. A comparison of 
Statistical Releases P0302 of 31 May 2005 and 1 August 2006, which contain the mid-year population estimates for 2005 and 
2006 respectively, reveals some very interesting changes in the estimated population growth rates.
39 These are the results one obtains if one assumes that the working age population grew by 450 000 a year in the 1996-1999 
period. It also assumes that the participation rate in 1999 was the same as it was in 2000. If one subtracts from the values for
prior years, the absolute percentage changes observed in the 1996-1999 series, one arrives at a participation rate of 54.7 per 
cent in 1997. Multiplying the simulated 1997 working age population (26.55 million), by the simulated participation rate, yields an 
economically active population of 14.5 million, not the 11.4 million that Netshitenzhe finds.
40 Between 2004 and 2005, formal economy employment grew by 250 000, while informal economy employment, if one ignores 
subsistence agriculture, grew by 500 000.
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“This is not to underplay the unemployment problem. According 
to the World Bank, at 56 percent, South Africa’s labour force 
participation is low compared with 75 percent in middle-income 
countries. What is critical is that, in acknowledging the problem 
and understanding its true, rather than imagined, origins, we 
are able through the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative 
South Africa (AsgiSA) and other programmes to fi nd sustainable 
solutions.” (Sunday Independent, August 20 2006)
There are two major problems with this statement. One of them is the distinct lack of fi t 
between the asserted ‘understanding of the true origins of the unemployment problem’ 
and the peculiarities disclosed in Tables 3, 4 and 5. If other aspects of AsgiSA are based 
on equally fl imsy analysis, it would be as well not to pin too much hope on the chances of 
that particular initiative meeting its goals. South Africa’s labour market statistics may not 
be ideal; misunderstanding them or misrepresenting the complex message they send out, 
ill becomes the body charged with the formulation of policy to deal with unemployment, 
one of the major causes of poverty.
The other problem arises because the South African government insists on maintaining 
the fiction that discouraged workseekers do not belong among the ranks of the 
economically active. When this is done, the country’s participation rate appears to be 
low, when compared with other middle-income countries. This nonsense originates in the 
Presidency. The Ten Year Review (PCAS, 2003) produced by that offi ce states that:
“Employment rate [sic. This should be Economic activity rate. 
CM] refl ects the proportion of the economically active population 
who consider themselves employed or looking for work (narrow 
defi nition). The measure thus excludes that proportion of people 
who are of economically active age but who have given up on 
seeking employment. This latter group is no longer considered 
economically active. ” (PCAS, 2003, p.126)
Equally ominously, the official estimates of the ‘official’ rate of unemployment were 
themselves rejected by no less an authority than the President himself. In his weekly 
column in ANC Today (20-26 May 2005), he wrote the following:
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“Citing Stats SA fi gures prepared on [the offi cial] basis, [the 
Department of Labour’s Labour Market Review of September 
2003] said that 4,400,000 people were unemployed in March 
2004. According to Stats SA, these were people who were actively 
looking for jobs or trying to create work for themselves. On this 
basis, Stats SA said our offi cial (narrow defi nition) unemployment 
rate in March 2004 was 26.9%.”
Given the structure of our society and our labour market, this 
means that in March 2004 there were at least 4 million South 
Africans walking about in our villages, our towns and cities 
“actively looking for work”. This is such a large number of people 
that nobody could possibly have missed the millions that would 
be in the streets and village paths “actively looking for work” in all 
likely places of employment.
It, therefore, seems quite unlikely that the Stats SA fi gure is 
correct, if indeed it used the standard international ILO defi nition 
to determine the unemployment rate. If this is the case, this means 
that it becomes very diffi cult to assess ourselves relative to other 
countries, which might use the ILO defi nition more strictly.”41
While the President’s attempt at gauging the severity of the unemployment problem by the 
method of casual empiricism (appearance vs. reality) is mildly entertaining, the stinging 
41 The article, one of three that referred to the unemployment figures, appeared in ANC Today: Online voice of the African National 
Congress, Volume 5, No. 20, 20-26 May 2005.       
Reuters picked up the President’s message on the 21 May 2005, and put out an article under the heading “Mbeki raises 
questions on SA jobless statistics”. Amongst other things, it quoted the following statements by the President: 
“Unfortunately, it is difficult to get an accurate picture of the job situation in the country. This is not to question the fact
that we have a high unemployment rate,” Mbeki said.       
He said it was hard to understand how South Africa could have a jobless rate of more than 26 per cent when Brazil’s 
stood at 10,8 per cent in March 2005.       
“The central matter at issue in this regard is that if in fact such a difference exists, we would then have to undertake 
actions to address unemployment, fundamentally different than any other country in the world,” he said.  
The article also reports an earlier rejection of the unemployment figures that goes like this: “Finance Minister Trevor 
Manuel said in his February budget for 2005 that if more than 40 percent of people were unemployed, there would be a 
revolution in the country.”
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critique of Statistics South Africa’s conduct of its surveys is not.42  To be accused of gross 
incompetence in the conducting of the Labour Force Surveys (LFSs) is no laughing 
matter.43  It would be idle to suggest that the LFSs are without problems – their inability, 
for example, to measure subsistence agricultural and informal economy employment with 
any credibility has long been recognised. The unemployment estimates themselves, and 
the manner in which the questionnaires have been designed to measure unemployment, 
have been subjected to scrutiny on a number of occasions in the past. Although the paper 
by Schlemmer and Levitz (1998), and the famous Standing et al (1995) critique of the 
fi gures, raised doubts, no-one has succeeded so far in showing that the fi gures are wrong. 
More recently, an (unpublished) IMF/World Bank sponsored review of the LFS suggested 
a number of improvements. Several of these, including a slimming down of the survey, 
have been introduced. To date, they have had no noticeable effects on unemployment 
rates.
It is not known what pressure, if any, was applied to Statistics South Africa to encourage 
them to publish only the offi cial unemployment rate (the Act governing the production of 
offi cial statistics is supposed to protect the Statistician-General against such infl uences). 
Whatever the case, the March 2004 LFS (SR P0210, 28 September 2004) was the last 
to contain a full treatment of the expanded unemployed. The LFSs now offer instead, 
selected information on the discouraged (as though they were a breed apart, instead of a 
sad group, many of whom switch to active searching status at the faintest whiff of a job).
In the old days, the two forms of unemployment were described as ‘strict’ and ‘expanded’ 
unemployment. Prior to 1996, the offi cial unemployment rate was said (in the 1995 October 
Household Survey) to represent:
“… the actual number of persons as determined in accordance 
with the expanded defi nition of unemployment, expressed as 
a percentage of the relevant economically active population.” 
(P0317, 27 November 1996, p.vii)
42 Shooting the messenger is not an unheard-of response to bad news. To a government whose policies to tackle unemployment 
have not been very richly rewarded, persistently high unemployment rates are an unwelcome sign of failure, ergo, their rates are 
wrong. Incidentally, Wikipedia says that the sentiment “No one loves the messenger who brings bad news” dates back at least to 
Sophocles’ Antigone (441 BC).
43 A dismissal of the LFS results implies a dismissal as well of General Household Survey figures. The LFS and GHS results, from
entirely independent samples, track each other quite remarkably. If the President is correct about the LFS results, then the only
way in which this could come about is for the surveys to be conducted with equal degrees of incompetence.
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News of the change in ‘offi cial’ defi nition was fi rst given in a special edition of the OHS 
which presented results for the years 1994-1997 (SR P0317.10, 13 August 1998).44  This 
publication stated that:
“The CSS has revised its defi nition of the offi cial unemployment 
rate in line with the defi nition of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) used by more than eighty percent of both 
developed and less-developed countries, and by South Africa’s 
major trading partners (see Appendix A).” (p.4)
To qualify as ‘offi cially unemployed’ the individuals concerned (a) must not have worked 
within the seven days prior to the interview, (b) must want to work and be available to 
start work within a week of the interview, and (c) must have taken active steps to fi nd 
work or start some form of self-employment within the four weeks prior to the interview 
(p.8). Appendix A showed that among the countries that did not use the work-seeking 
requirement in the ‘offi cial’ measure, one could fi nd highly-developed lands like Norway 
and Sweden, sprawling, poor democracies like India, and struggling sub-Saharan nations 
like Gabon and the Central African Republic.
Research conducted by the then CSS (Central Statistics Service)) showed that the main 
reasons for the cessation of job-seeking activity were:
• a loss of hope of fi nding work (33 per cent),
• a lack of jobs in the areas in which respondents live (25 per cent), and
• a lack of money for transport to look for work (18 per cent) (SR P0317.10, 13 
August 1998, p.8)
44 The comparative study giving results for the years 1994-1997 (SR P0317.10, 13 August 1998) was published in time for the 1998
Presidential Job Summit. Because full 1996 Population Census results were not available at the time, it was weighted to the 
census post-enumeration survey. When the much-delayed 1996 October Household Survey was published (P0317, 30 August 
1999), a definitive set of results, weighted to the 1996 Population Census, finally became available. See P0317, 30 August 1999,
p.3.
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Statistics South Africa’s anxiety to comply with international practice in the matter of 
publishing unemployment statistics, would have received a substantial fillip from 
government’s enthusiasm for meeting with the requirements of the IMF’s Special Data 
Dissemination Series (SDDS), “established in 1996 to guide countries seeking access 
to international capital markets” (http://dsbb.imf.org/Applications/web/sddshome/, 7 Dec 
2006). This commitment trumps all other arguments. Statistics South Africa would thus 
have had no need to furnish any further justifi cation for the change.45  No argument in 
favour of the ‘offi cial’ rate is required other than the fact that it is ‘offi cial’ and is used by 
many countries, including South Africa’s major trading partners. Interestingly, though, 
there is explicit recognition that at least for domestic policy purposes, the expanded rate 
may be appropriate or relevant. So much is clear in the following statement:
“The CSS has reported the expanded rate as well as the new 
offi cial defi nition of the unemployment rate in this release, partly 
for comparability with previous reports; and partly because, as 
the ILO notes, an expanded defi nition may be appropriate “in 
situations where conventional means of seeking work are of limited 
relevance, where the labour market is unorganised or of limited 
scope, where labour absorption is at the time inadequate… There 
are various indications that these circumstances are applicable to 
some extent in South Africa.” (SR P0317.10, 13 August 1998, 
p.8)
A commitment to furnish ‘offi cial’ rates of unemployment for the SDDS has no bearing on 
whether or not the expanded unemployment results are published as well.46  Excluding 
them from the ranks of the unemployed smacks of political expediency – four million 
sounds less bad than eight million. As Kingdon and Knight (2000) demonstrated several 
years ago, differences between the searching and the non-searching unemployed (the 
offi cial and expanded unemployed) that would justify their being treated differently for 
policy purposes, do not exist. If, however, government decrees that the discouraged 
are not to be counted among the economically active, then it follows that South Africa’s 
45 They could, under other circumstances, have searched for evidence that investment decisions are sensitive to unemployment 
rates, thus rendering internationally comparable results necessary.
46 The fact that the ILO recommends using only the ‘official’ rate of unemployment is irrelevant – as we have seen above (Footnote
3), the bulk of the discouraged do not search for work because they do not believe (and reasonably so) that there is any to be 
had.
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participation rate will be lower than it would have been if all of the unemployed were 
taken into account. The World Bank conclusion, cited by Netshitenzhe above, that the 
participation rate than that in comparable middle income countries, is thus the beginning, 
not the end of an analysis. That analysis should aim at discovering the relative proportions 
of the discouraged, and of the potential among the economically inactive for changing 
their status to economically active, in the countries the Bank asserts to be comparable 
with South Africa. Until such an analysis is performed, international comparisons of the 
type referred to by Netshitenzhe are meaningless.47
47 At 67-68 per cent, South Africa’s participation rate is not all that far from those of other middle-income countries. There is not 
much slack left in the labour market – most of the economically inactive have plausible reasons for being so, the most important
of these being the fact that many are still at school. Servaas van der Berg made this point in his presentation at the DPRU 
Conference in October 2006. It is not in the paper circulated for the conference.
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 4. Progress in the Struggle Against Poverty?
Poverty is a political problem. The land is bountiful – there is more than enough for 
everyone to live well above poverty levels. The fact that some starve while others die 
of diseases of over-consumption is the outcome of political choices, past and present. 
Solving the poverty problem is possible only if appropriate policy choices are made. 
Making and implementing those choices requires reliable information, a commodity 
seemingly in short supply.
When poverty is as widespread as it is in South Africa, the time and energy devoted to 
formulating and implementing policies to reduce, or better still, eradicate poverty must 
needs be large. If commitment to these goals were gauged by the number of measures 
introduced (and the amount of money thrown at the problem), government’s performance 
would be rated highly. How effective these measures have been, is, however, a different 
matter.
For many years, poverty researchers have claimed that both poverty and inequality 
have worsened. Rather obviously, such claims will be, and have been poorly received 
by politicians. Government has responded by repeatedly pointing to the vast amounts 
spent each year on the ‘social wage’ (essentially, housing, health, sanitation, education, 
electricity, and water, plus social grants). This has not, as we have seen above, stilled the 
protests about poverty (and poor service delivery).
Then, at the end of September 2005, like manna, came the news from Professor Servaas 
van der Berg and his colleagues in the University of Stellenbosch, that the poverty 
headcount (the number of people below the poverty line), having climbed from about 16.2 
million in 1993 to 18.5 million in 2000, fell thereafter to 15.4 million in 2004. The poverty 
line used was R250 per capita per month in 2000 prices (van der Berg et al, 2005, p.17), 
which amounted to about R10 per day per person in 2004. The primary cause of the drop 
in the poverty headcount (and the improvement in the conditions of those still below the 
poverty line) is said to be the massive increase in the numbers of people receiving social 
grants.
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Government lost a little, but not much time,48 before harvesting the propaganda fruits of 
these fi ndings. President Mbeki used the van der Berg et al fi gures to reassure Prince N 
E Zulu, during question time in Parliament on March 30th 2006, that government was on 
course to halve the poverty rate by 2015. The numbers surface again in A Nation in the 
Making: A Discussion Document on Macro-Social Trends in South Africa (PCAS, 2006, 
p.12), the follow-up to the Ten Year Review (PCAS, 2003).49 Netshitenzhe uses them 
once more in his critique of Pilger (Sunday Independent, August 20 2006), in an attempt 
to show that the conditions of the poor are not as bad as Pilger claims. Given that one 
of Pilger’s favourite quotations is some advice from Claud Cockburn, who said “Never 
believe anything until it is offi cially denied”, denial will presumably have confi rmed (for 
him) that he is on target, even if not in the bulls-eye. And he [Pilger] would be right to be 
suspicious, for despite Netshitenzhe’s (and the President’s) apparent confi dence in the 
van der Berg et al results, they certainly do not deserve the appellation ‘facts’ – they are, 
as suggested above, one among a set of competing artefacts produced by a group of 
social scientists.
a. Different Database – Different Artefacts
Professor van der Berg and his co-workers have created one set of artefacts – here is 
an alternative set – using the same poverty line as they did, research I have undertaken 
suggests that the poverty headcount in 2004 was about 18 million, and about 19.5 million 
in 2001 (Meth, 2006a; 2006b). Instead of a fall in the headcount of three-million reported 
by van der Berg et al, my guess is thus that it was closer to one-and-a-half million. A brief 
description of the way I arrive at my estimates follows.
The 18 million people below the poverty line can be divided into two groups. About 14 
million of them were in ‘workerless’ households, most of which contain working age 
people, none of whom reports having done any work, paid or unpaid,50 in the seven days 
48 There was no mention of their results in the President’s State of the Nation speech (3 February 2006). The President refers 
instead to the social wage paper by Bhorat et al (2006). In the Minister of Finance’s Budget Speech (15 February 2006), poverty 
and the social wage are each mentioned once by name. Poverty statistics are not discussed. The social wage is treated at some 
length. Apropos the education component of social spending, the Minister, with characteristic flair, said that “School fees will be 
phased out in low-income communities this year, and Minister Pandor confirms that in three weeks time the last remaining 17 
trees will no longer substitute for classrooms.”  If true, this is good news.
49 Netshitenzhe appears to have played a key role in both.
50 The unpaid labour of ‘homemakers’ (chiefly housewives) does not count as work for purposes of the employment definition. 
Several other unpaid activities do – of the eight listed, only begging does not count as employment. Any of the other seven 
activities need only have been performed for one hour during the reference period to qualify as employment. See Question 2.1 in
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prior to the LFS interview taking place. People in these households survived on a mix 
of social grants and/or migrant remittances. Among the remaining four million people 
(located in 700 000 households) about 800 000 were employed. Their presence below 
the poverty line indicates that the problem of the working poor is still very much with us. 
Research into ways of dealing with it is urgently required.
On the positive side, the poverty rate (the proportion of people below the poverty line) 
even if it did not fall by the amount suggested by van der Berg et al, is likely to have fallen. 
In the absence of such a fall, and the improved social protection by which it was caused, 
poverty would have been much worse. The poverty gap (the sum that would need to be 
transferred to the poor each year to raise all of them above the poverty line) has probably 
fallen as well. It has done so in both absolute terms (the size of the transfer) and in 
relative terms (the proportion it represents of GDP).
Since full descriptions are available in two recent papers (Meth, 2006a; 2006b) of the 
means by which my results have been extracted from their primary data sources,51 only 
the briefest of descriptions of their origins, and of the way in which the numerous obstacles 
encountered en route were addressed, need be offered here. Once that has been done, 
we take a look at the plausibility of the claim that three million people were lifted over the 
poverty line between 2000 and 2004, mainly by social grants. The paper concludes with a 
few recommendations, one of which refers to the need, given the highly politicised nature 
of the debate over poverty and inequality, for greater care in the production and use of 
estimates that purport to measure their severity.
b. Matters Methodological
Understanding poverty in South Africa, at least on a national scale, a diffi cult enough 
task as it is, is made more diffi cult still by inadequacies in the survey and census data 
on which research must be based. Among the limitations are (i) the fact that survey 
respondents under-state income and expenditure levels, (ii) surveys miss some forms 
of income, e.g., investment income such as rent, interest and profi t, and (iii) there are 
the September 2004 LFS. Information on time spent fetching water and wood or dung (Questions 1.14-1.17) is collected, but this 
is not treated as employment. Satellite accounts for activities such as domestic production, that take place outside of production
boundary of the System of National Accounts (SNA) and that are consistent with the SNA, can be constructed. Few countries, 
however, do so.
51 The Labour Force Surveys for September 2001 and September 2004, and the General Household Survey for 2004.
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many households for which income is unknown (the income estimate is returned as zero) 
because respondents refuse to answer income questions, or do not know the answers to 
the question. These problems are faced, in varying degree, by all poverty researchers.
Because income and expenditure is under-reported in surveys, the value of total income 
or expenditure that can be estimated from household surveys is invariably smaller than 
the total estimated from the national accounts. Reliance on unadjusted survey fi gures is 
likely to cause poverty to be over-stated. One technique for dealing with this problem is 
to raise survey totals (or means) to match national accounts totals (or means). National 
accounts, however, are argued to overstate absolute income levels. Using them to adjust 
survey incomes for under-reporting, could, depending on the way in which adjustments 
to income are distributed, cause poverty to be under-stated. Their use for this purpose is 
therefore not recommended (Ravallion, 2000, 2003: Deaton, 2003).
Part of the source of the van der Berg et al results is a hitherto untouched (as far as 
poverty studies are concerned) set of surveys, the All Media and Products Surveys, 
(AMPS). This innovative attempt to break out of the straitjacket of reliance on offi cial 
statistics is thoroughly commendable. To deal with the under-reporting problem, however, 
they fl out Deaton’s and Ravallion’s recommendations, saying that they:
“… trust national accounts data for aggregate household income, 
[and] trust survey data for the distribution of such income between 
households.” (van der Berg et al, 2005, p.11)
Doing so must at least raise questions about the methodological soundness of their 
approach, and hence, of the reliability of their fi ndings.
In their paper, van der Berg et al engage critically with existing poverty studies in South 
Africa. Most of these are based either on the population censuses of 1996 and 2001, or 
the marriage of the Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) of 1995 to the 1995 October 
Household Survey (OHS), and the similar pairing of the 2000 IES with the LFS of 
September 2000. Not only are these data sources more than somewhat dated, they have 
been mined so extensively that they are probably approaching the point of exhaustion. If 
any further insights are to be gained from existing offi cial statistics, they are going to have 
to come from the two major household surveys, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the 
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General Household Survey (GHS).52  Far from being fully-exploited, the Labour Force 
Surveys (at least up until September 2004) and the General Household Surveys offer a 
wealth of data from which plausible estimates of the extent of poverty can be squeezed.
Although neither the LFS nor the GHS are designed to measure poverty,53 one advantage 
they have over the AMPS when pressed into this duty, is that they collect information 
on both income and expenditure. The AMPS, by contrast, whose purpose is also not to 
answer questions about poverty, only collect information on income, and then only in 
intervals or categories.54 Because the LFS and GHS collect both expenditure and income 
data, it is possible to impute expenditure estimates where income fi gures are missing, and 
vice-versa. The independence of the income and expenditure data also allows estimates 
of poverty made from one source to be checked against the other. Accordingly, I made one 
set of estimates using the expenditure data (Meth, 2006a). This was followed by a paper 
containing a second set of estimates (Meth, 2006b), extracted from the income data in the 
surveys. It is from the latter paper that the results given in this section of the present paper 
are taken. They offer support to the fi ndings of the earlier paper. Obstacles encountered 
along the way fell into four categories. Three of them plague almost all censuses and 
surveys. They are: missing income estimates; implausible the zero-income estimates 
and under-reporting of income and expenditure. The fourth, the inadequacy of the data 
on social grants collected by the Labour Force Surveys (LFSs), is peculiar to that survey.
Among the employed in September 2004, only 6.8 per cent of respondents did not furnish 
adequate income data.55  After imputation based on household expenditure data, the 
proportion of the employed for which no income data was available, was reduced to 1.8 
per cent. The bulk of these were among (mainly white) households which refused to 
supply both income and expenditure data. They are assumed to be unlikely to be poor.
52 Earlier Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) used the recall method to capture data. The current survey uses the diary method.
It is not possible to tell yet, what insights may come from the revamped IESs. 
53 Both surveys have their origins in the October Household Survey, last conducted in 1999. That the OHS was intended to be used
as an instrument for monitoring poverty is made clear in the explanatory notes. See SR P0317, 31 July 2000, p.i.
54 It has been suggested that there are problems with the AMPS sampling. I have not made any attempt to delve into that question.
Although I offer a few critical observations on the approach adopted by van der Berg et al (2005), the aim of the two papers 
I wrote (Meth 2006a and 2006b) was not to develop an extensive critique of their work. Rather, it was to show that plausible 
estimates of poverty could be extracted from household surveys conducted by Statistics South Africa. Given the sample sizes 
of the AMPS and the Stats SA surveys, one would expect them to generate similar results. The fact that they do not, creates a 
research agenda. Sooner or later, the question of why they do not, will have to be addressed. 
55 The September 2001 LFS figures are similar. Details of the ‘refuses’ and ‘don’t knows’ and other missing income estimates are
given in the next section of the paper
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Workerless households, by defi nition, do not receive any of their incomes in the form 
of earnings from persons in the household. At the bottom (the poor end) of the income 
distribution, these zero-(earned) income households subsist on social grants and migrant 
remittances. After allowing for income from these sources in the roughly four million 
workerless households that contained more than 14 million people below the poverty line 
in 2004, the number of people for whom no incomes could be found dwindled to about 1.8 
million. A possible explanation for their lack of income is the shortness of the reference 
period during which reported incomes were received (the seven days previous to the 
interview). The people involved have the typical characteristics of the poor. It is argued 
that zero-incomes (earned in the reference period) among this group are not implausible.
Under-reporting of income and expenditure is considered at some length in Meth (2006a 
and 2006b). In the latter, the paper from which the results considered here are taken, 
the adjustment required to raise estimated survey total income to national accounts 
totals, is in the region of about 80 per cent, i.e., earned income is multiplied by 1.8.56
There is, of course, no guarantee that the national accounts fi gures are correct – the 
burden of the Deaton article cited above (2003), for example, is precisely that they are 
not, national accounts being argued to overstate incomes. The point of raising incomes 
to national accounts levels is to see what sort of poverty estimates results when the 
Statistics South Africa household surveys, rather than the AMPS are used to generate the 
relevant distributions.
In any event, arriving at the fi gure of 80 per cent entails making the assumptions that 
(a) under-reporting of earned-incomes is uniform across all income groups, and (b) that 
investment income that is not detected by the LFS amounts to about 15 per cent of the 
national accounts income estimate. Evidence in support of these assumptions is diffi cult 
to obtain. There is a suggestion in the literature that under-reporting is a monotonically 
increasing function of income. Arguments could be mustered to suggest that the under-
reporting function may be U-shaped, being most signifi cant at very-low and very-high 
incomes. In the absence of convincing evidence in support of this, the uniform assumption 
is preferred. In any case, there are so few workers among poor households, that to get 
somewhere near the van der Berg et al results, it has to be assumed that earned incomes 
are under-reported by 200 per cent or more (i.e., actual earned income is three times 
as high as reported income). Roughly similar income patterns to those yielded by the 
56 The adjustment to correct for a 100 per cent under-reporting error is a doubling of earned incomes.
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September 2004 LFS are reported by the 2004 GHS. It seems unlikely that respondents 
in two completely independent surveys would tell similar lies about incomes. Unless 
convincing evidence of bias among low-income respondents can be found, modesty 
dictates that an adjustment in the region of about 80-85 per cent would be appropriate. 
This, as noted above, would raise total survey income to roughly the same as the national 
accounts total. If the South African national accounts are prey to over-estimation of 
income and expenditure levels as Ravallion (2000, 2003) and Deaton (2003) suggest is 
the case elsewhere in the world, then an assumed under-reporting error of that level57
would probably be conservative in that it would tend to understate poverty.
Prior to September 2004, both the GHS and the LFS set out to capture information on the 
receipt of social grants.58  Of the two, the GHS did a better (though not quite satisfactory) 
job. This was because of the wording of the relevant questions. The LFS merely asked 
whether anyone in the household received any of the listed grants, whereas the GHS 
asked which individuals received them. Comparing both surveys with the administrative 
data from the Department of Social Development (the SocPen database) discloses their 
inadequacies in the collection of data on the ‘big three’, the old age pension, disability 
grants and the child support grant. Of about 3.05 million people lifted over the poverty 
line of R309 per month per capita in 2004 (R250 in 2000 prices), the big three (in terms 
of numbers of benefi ciaries) are responsible for about 3.02 million. Doubling or even 
trebling numbers of the lesser grants (foster care, care dependency and the grant-in-
aid) would have a measurable, but small effect on numbers in poverty. Attention was 
focused, therefore, on the big three when it came to devising ways to compensate for the 
weakness of the LFSs in their role as collector of information on social grants. The GHS 
fi nds too many state old age pensioners. Correcting the LFS by multiplying the number 
of households reporting receipt of a pension by the mean number of pensioners per 
household reported by the GHS brings the LFS totals close to the administrative data. 
Not much more was necessary as far as the pensions were concerned. Child support 
grant numbers were taken over the top of the administrative fi gures by awarding a grant 
to a household reporting receipt of the grant and containing one eligible child; two to a 
household containing two eligible children, and so on, where eligibility was determined 
by age alone (less than 12 years, the age group reached by the grant system in 2004). 
To deal with the over-estimate of the number of grants paid out, their value was scaled 
57 The 80-85 per cent under-reporting error is coupled with the estimate that the surveys miss an assumed 15 per cent of total 
national accounts income in the form of investment income.
58 The LFS no longer collects information on grants, or on household expenditure, a serious loss – see Meth 2006a and 2006b.
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downwards to make total payout the same for the survey as it was according to the 
administrative fi gures.
Most troublesome to deal with adequately was the disability grant. Although it may 
be appropriate to argue that almost all of the disability grant payout goes towards the 
reduction of the poverty gap, it is not correct to treat the grant’s impact on the poverty 
headcount in a similar way. This is because the extent to which the grant is capable of 
meeting the special needs of the disabled is not easily determined. In their profi le of 
social security benefi ciaries in South Africa, de Koker et al (2006) give an indication of 
the extent of ‘additional expenses incurred due to disability’ (Section 5.3.5.2). Some of 
the sums involved are substantial. Information on four categories of expenditure, medical, 
extra assistance or care, regular therapy or treatment and other expenses is presented 
in Tables 5.76-5.79 (Vol. 1, pp.225-228). In other words, the poverty line for the disabled 
is likely to be quite a lot higher than that for the non-disabled. From the profi les in Vol. 3 
of the work, it would appear that most of the households receiving disability grants are 
very poor. Only four per cent of benefi ciaries were employed, while 21 per cent of the 
households in which they live report having missed a meal in the previous month for want 
of money (Vol. 3, pp.653-654). On these grounds, it seems reasonable to assume that 
consumption levels of the members of some (unknown) proportion of the poor households 
into which disability grants fl owed would still have fallen below the poverty.
Partial compensation for the fact that the LFS undercounts the number of disability grants 
is made by multiplying the value of the grant going into households by the ratio of the 
number of grants detected by the GHS, to the number of households reported by the 
LFS as receiving at least one disability grant. This pumps up the value of the grant 
going into mainly poor households, making some (arbitrary) correction for the condition 
referred to above, namely the fact that a poverty line of R250 per month per capita 
almost certainly does not allow for the special needs of many of the disabled to be met. A 
more parsimonious correction assumes that only half of the 1.36 million grant recipients 
recorded by the administrative data receive enough to meet their needs. The value of the 
grant is scaled downwards and delivered to the 894 000 households detected by the LFS. 
These two assumptions are called respectively (the fi rst of them somewhat misleadingly), 
the full value and half value assumptions.
Migrant remittances presented the fi nal problem that had to be dealt with to produce 
a set of poverty estimates. The question here is with the extent of under-reporting of 
remittances. Two assumptions are used – one that under-reporting is zero; the other that 
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under-reporting of remittances is the same as that of other earned incomes. Together, the 
procedures described above yield Table 6 (Table 6 in Meth, 2006b).
Table 6:  Poverty Estimates, 2004 - Income from all Sources
Error level Zero 75% 100% 200%
1. Half-value disability grant, Zero under-reporting of remittances
Headcount ratio (P0) 0.507 0.423 0.395 0.365
Poverty gap ratio (P1) 0.286 0.245 0.237 0.216
Headcount 23 200 000 19 300 000 18 400 000 16 700 000
Poverty gap Rbn 45.5 38.5 37.1 33.4
2. Half-value disability grant, Remittance under-reporting same as income
Headcount ratio (P0) - 0.408 0.376 0.358
Poverty gap ratio (P1) - 0.235 0.224 0.209
Headcount - 18 600 000 17 600 000 16 400 000
Poverty gap Rbn - 36.7 34.9 32.2
3. Full-value disability grant, Zero under-reporting of remittances
Headcount ratio (P0) 0.495 0.413 0.386 0.332
Poverty gap ratio (P1) 0.277 0.237 0.229 0.197
Headcount 22 600 000 18 900 000 18 000 000 15 200 000
Poverty gap Rbn 44.0 37.0 35.7 30.1
4. Full-value disability grant, Remittance under-reporting same as income
Headcount ratio (P0) - 0.399 0.367 0.325
Poverty gap ratio (P1) - 0.227 0.216 0.191
Headcount - 18 200 000 17 100 000 14 900 000
Poverty gap Rbn - 35.3 33.4 29.0
Note: All sources means all income from employment, migrant remittances and all
social grants
Source: Own calculations using September 2004 LFS data set
Poverty in September 2004 is probably going to be somewhere in the region shaded grey 
in the middle of the table (as noted above, making a 100 per cent income under-reporting 
adjustment would be excessive). In place of the van der Berg et al (2005, Table 2) poverty 
headcount ratio of 0.332, we are looking at something in the region of 0.39, while the 
poverty gap ratio, instead of sinking to 0.146 in 2004 from 0.205 in 2000, as they suggest, 
was possibly about 0.23. Translating the latter into the value of the annual transfer that 
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would need to be made to eradicate poverty (as defi ned by the miserly R250 line!) would 
be about R35 billion per annum (in 2004 prices). This was less than four per cent of the 
value of the national accounts estimate of income in 2004.
As may be seen, the headcount hovers somewhere around the 18-million mark, 
depending on what assumptions are deployed. The estimates are sensitive to the 
assumptions, but even on the most parsimonious of them (with survey total income almost 
certainly climbing above the national accounts total) the headcount does not fall below 17 
million. So much for the 2004 estimate – let us look now at the fi gures for 2001.
c. Changes in Poverty 2001-2004
An estimate of changes in poverty levels between 2001 and 2004 is presented in Table 
7.59  The September 2000 LFS cannot be used to test the proposition (from the van der 
Berg et al piece) that the headcount fell by three million or so between 2000 and 2004, 
because in its infancy, the LFS did not ask for expenditure data.60  The non-response 
problem for the income questions in the September 2000 LFS cannot be addressed with 
any ease because the absence of expenditure data robs us of the simple method by 
which to impute incomes.
Fortunately, the expenditure question (which used to be in the October Household 
Surveys – OHSs) was restored to the LFSs in September 2001. Non-responses or poor 
responses to the income question do not disappear in that and subsequent LFSs (and 
GHSs as well). The expenditure questions in them, however, elicit far fewer ‘Refuses’ or 
‘Don’t knows’ (or other forms of missing information) than do the income questions. That 
makes it possible to impute income for all but a small percentage of the workforce, even 
if the simple category-type questions only permit rough approximations.61  So, although it 
is not possible (or, at least, not very easy) to look at changes in poverty over the period 
2000-2004, it is possible to do so for the period 2001-2004.
59 This is Table 8 in Meth (2006b).
60 The first LFS was conducted in February 2000, the last October Household Survey having been carried out in 1999.
61 Where expenditure fails us, it has at least been possible to use race as a proxy (albeit a very crude one) to permit an educated
guess to be made of the likelihood of particular workers being poor.
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Three sets of results are presented, two of them for the year 2004. One set is obtained 
from the September 2004 LFS and the other from the GHS for that year. Neither the 
GHS nor the September 2001 LFS collected data on migrant remittances. To make the 
September 2004 LFS fi gures comparable, it is necessary, therefore, to strip remittances 
from the income definition. It is also necessary to treat disability grants for the two 
years in the same way. Accordingly, the September 2004 LFS fi gures in Table 7 use 
the ‘full value’ assumption (described above) for disability grants. Poverty headcounts 
for September 2004 thus exceed their counterparts in Table 6 by the amount by which 
remittances reduce poverty. A little mental arithmetic suggests that remittances appear 
to lift somewhere between one and one-and-a-half million people over the poverty line 
(depending on the extent to which incomes and remittances are under-reported). Lest it 
be thought that this number is small, it should be borne in mind that remittances fulfi l the 
vital function of sending income into workerless households, even if they are not large 
enough to lift many of these households out of poverty.
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Table 7:  Poverty in South Africa, 2001-2004
2004 GHS
Error level Zero 75% 100% 200%
Headcount ratio (P0) 0.542 0.460 0.442 0.401
Poverty gap ratio (P1) 0.231 0.186 0.180 0.155
Headcount 25 100 000 21 300 000 20 400 000 18 600 000
Poverty gap Rbn 55.0 47.5 46.3 42.0
September 2004 LFS
Error level Zero 75% 100% 200%
Headcount ratio (P0) 0.510 0.427 0.399 0.370
Poverty gap ratio (P1) 0.305 0.262 0.255 0.235
Headcount 23 300 000 19 500 000 18 600 000 16 900 000
Poverty gap Rbn 48.8 41.4 40.1 36.6
September 2001 LFS
Error level Zero 75% 100% 200%
Headcount ratio (P0) 0.549 0.459 0.439 0.389
Poverty gap ratio (P1) 0.375 0.322 0.310 0.310
Headcount 24 800 000 20 700 000 19 800 000 17 600 000
Poverty gap Rbn 50.5 43.0 41.3 37.7
Change: Sept 01-Sept 04 -1 500 000 -1 200 000 -1 200 000 -700 000
Source: Own calculations using September 2004 LFS, the 2004 GHS, and the September
2001 data sets . Revised weights, supplied by Statistics South Africa, have been applied to
the 2001 LFS data.
Note: Income equals income from employment plus social grants. No data on remittances
are collected by the GHS and the September 2001 LFS.
There are three striking features in the results in Table 7.  The fi rst is that it looks, from the 
two sets of LFS results, as though the headcount fell by about 1.2 million over the three 
years, a far cry from the 3.1 million reported by van der Berg et al for the four-year period. 
The second, however, is the quite substantial drop in the poverty gap ratio (possibly from 
about 0.316 to about 0.258). Third are the big differences between the LFS and GHS 
results for 2004, the latter generating a far more gloomy picture.
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Digging into the fi nding that the poverty headcount fall between 2001 and 2004 could 
have been about 1.2 million (let us be generous and say that it could have been as high 
as 1.5 million) if we discount the zero-error and 200 per cent error estimates, it could be 
argued that this is not inconsistent with expectations. A substantial part of the social grant 
system was already in place,62 employment growth was slack, and there were simply not 
enough workers in poor households for income growth to have made much of a dent in 
poverty.
To reject the fi nding that the fall in the headcount was approximately one-and-a-half 
million (instead of three million), a number of arguments could be advanced, the fi rst 
being that it is inappropriate to use two sets of cross-section survey results as though 
they were time-series data. If this objection is valid, however, it must apply with equal 
force to the van der Berg et al effort, which does the same thing with AMPS survey data. 
Another possible problem is that the sample for the 2001 LFS was not adequate.63  It 
is also possible that the survey design is such that unemployment, the major cause of 
poverty in South Africa, is signifi cantly overstated, while employment is understated. To 
investigate fully each of the ways in which the results may have been infected, is no small 
undertaking. As a researcher, I am compelled, as are van der Berg et al (2005, p.),64 to 
take certain fi ndings on trust. The onus is upon those who would dismiss my fi ndings, to 
show why it is inappropriate for me to have relied upon the sources in question.
Although estimated declines in headcounts in Table 7 are relatively slight, the falls in the 
headcount ratio are fairly substantial. Possible increases in poverty caused by population 
growth, on the one hand, and the reduction in poverty caused by the extension of the 
social grants,65 on the other, are working in opposite directions, with the latter dominant, in 
62 See Table 4 in Meth (2006b).
63 The ‘missings’, ‘don’t knows’ and ‘refuses’ among respondents in the September 2001 LFS are similar in proportion and number
to those in the September 2004 LFS. In 2001, there were 26 532 employed respondents. Of them, 18 920 (71.3 per cent) gave 
point estimates of income, while 5 997 (22.6 per cent) gave category estimates. ‘Missings’, ‘don’t knows’ and ‘refuses’ numbered
1 618 (6.1 per cent of the employed). After imputation using data on expenditure, this was reduced to 637 cases (2.4 per cent of
the employed). Source: own calculations using September 2001 LFS data set.
64 They “trust national accounts data for aggregate household income” and AMPS “survey data for the distribution of such income
between households.” (2005, p.11)
65 In the absence of the increases in the numbers of social grants, poverty would obviously have been much worse in 2004. Applying
the 2001 headcount ratios to the 2004 population suggests that there would have been somewhere between 1.8-2.2 million more 
poor people in 2004 than are reported in Table 7.
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part, because population growth rates are falling.66  This outcome prompts a consideration 
of the contribution, positive or negative, of population growth to poverty reduction. 
South Africa’s poverty reduction goal, like that of the other countries committed to the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, is one of halving the ‘rate’, i.e., the 
headcount ratio (P
0
).67  The adoption of such a goal does not mean that headcount itself 
must fall as well – it is quite possible for population growth to cause headcounts to rise 
while headcount ratios fall. Whether, under such conditions, one can say that poverty had 
‘gone down’ is one of the ‘hard questions’ posed by Kanbur (2004, pp.6-7). As we shall 
see below, however, population growth rates in South Africa have fallen so much, that 
there is now little chance of such a question having to be answered.
Poverty in the period 2001-2004 in South Africa appears, however, unambiguously to 
have ‘gone down’. The headcount ratio (P
0
) and the headcount, as well as the poverty 
gap ratio (P
1
) and the poverty all fall. The critical question, of course, is, by how much? 
Presumably emboldened by the van der Berg et al (2005) fi ndings on poverty reduction, 
senior politicians, as we have seen above, have taken recently to asserting with confi dence 
that the poverty halving goal will be met.68  It is not known if these assertions are based on 
a model, or are merely back-of-envelope calculations informed by the apparent success of 
poverty reduction in the period 2000-2004.
Building a model to speculate on future possibilities is, of course, simplicity itself (how 
accurate its predictions are, depends entirely, of course, on how well the future values of 
the relevant variables have been guesstimated). Assume that, because full take-up of the 
planned extensions to South Africa’s social grant will soon be reached, the van der Berg 
et al poverty reduction estimates for period cannot be extrapolated very far into the future. 
66 Population growth rates for the years  2001-2002; 2002-2003; 2003-2004; 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 respectively are, 1.25; 
1.22; 1.19; 1.17 and 1.06. See mid-year population estimates for 2006 (P0302, 1 August 2006, Table 5, p.6). The decline in the 
population growth rate after 2004 (0.11 percentage points) is much larger than those in previous years. Population growth rates
in the 2006 release are higher than the corresponding rates in the mid-year population estimates for 2005 (P0302, 31 May 2005, 
Table 7, p.10).
67 In South Africa’s case, the target year is 2014, the 20th anniversary of the commencement of democratic rule, rather than by 
2015. It is not obvious what base year the South African government has in mind. The United Nations uses 1995. Because 
of the fragmented nature of South African statistics, poverty levels in 1994 or 1995 are the subject of some disagreement. 
AsgiSA seems to suggest that the intention is to halve the rate of poverty to “less than one sixth of households”. This precedes
a statement which says that “there remain about a third of South African households not yet able to benefit directly from our 
economic advances”. I take it that this is a way of saying that the (household) poverty rate is (currently) about 0.33. One could
conclude from this that the base year is 2006.
68 Recall that President Mbeki used the figures to reassure Prince N E Zulu, during question time in Parliament on March 30t2006,
that government was on course to halve the poverty rate by 2015, while Joel Netshitenzhe uses them to make the same claim in 
his critique of Pilger (Sunday Independent, August 20 2006).
DPRU Working Paper 07/123
               48
Assume, instead, that the headcount falls by three million between 2004 and 2014. With a 
sustained decline in the population growth rate of 0.06 percentage points each year from a 
reported population growth rate of 1.17 per cent per annum in 2004-2005, the headcount 
ratio would fall from 0.410 to 0.314. Using these same assumptions, but aiming for a 
halving of the poverty headcount ratio (to 0.205) in 2014, would require the headcount 
to fall from 18.6 million in 2004 to 10.2 million in the end year, a tall order.69  Interestingly, 
the poverty halving goal becomes harder to achieve (in absolute terms) as the fall in the 
population growth rate accelerates. This is because a smaller end-year population with a 
given headcount ratio, yields a smaller headcount in the end-year, thus raising the number 
that have to be lifted out of poverty between the start-year and the end-year.
Unless the rate of poverty reduction, as measured by the headcount ratio, slows to 
a barely discernible trickle, it is highly unlikely, in South Africa’s case, that Kanbur’s 
hard question of whether a fall in the poverty rate accompanied by a rise in the poverty 
headcount, constitutes a reduction in the severity of poverty, will be posed. HIV/AIDS 
has reduced the population growth rate by enough to ensure that even a slight fall in the 
headcount ratio will be accompanied by a fall in the headcount itself. It would be sobering, 
amidst the premature celebration of the likely attainment of the poverty halving goal, for 
the contribution of this awful epidemic to that (possible, but unlikely) achievement, to be 
acknowledged.
d. A Three-Million Headcount Fall, 2000-2004?
Poverty reduction can come about for three reasons: employment growth; earnings growth 
and increases in social grant income. The claim by van der Berg et al that the number of 
people living in poverty fell by three million between 2000 and 2004 does not receive 
much support from the available evidence. That evidence is reviewed in Meth (2006b). It 
is not the intention to do much more than to summarise the major fi ndings here.
69 To produce a situation in which the hard question about poverty arises to which Kanbur (2004) refers, it would be necessary to
have population growth rates not seen in South Africa for a long time, as the following (obviously hypothetical) example shows.
All other things being equal, if we start with a headcount ratio of 0.41 in 2004, and we assume that the population growth falls by 
0.02 percentage points per annum, the headcount would remain static over the period 2004-2014, if the population growth rate 
in 2004 had been 2.5 per cent per annum. The headcount ratio in 2014 would then be about 0.325. If the population growth rate 
did not fall, the headcount would begin to rise slowly, thus prompting the Kanbur ‘hard question’.
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As far as employment is concerned, it looks as though those in the best-off households 
scored handsomely, while the numbers employed at lower income levels fell. The number 
of workers living in households with incomes of R10 000 or more per month, increased by 
more than 600 000 between 2001 and 2004. In households where income was less than 
R1236 per month, home to more than 70 per cent of the poor, over 200 000 jobs were 
lost between 2001 and 2004. In the van der Berg et al paper, a simulation exercise (2005, 
p.21) fi nds a pro-poor bias to one million hypothetical jobs. If the LFSs are to be believed, 
the reality is quite the opposite.
For evidence of earnings growth, we turn to the work of two of the co-authors of the van 
der Berg et al (2005) paper, Burger and Yu (2006). The authors present their results in 
graphical rather than table form. This is a bit of drawback, because one has to guess 
at the numbers underlying the graphs. It is also a bit of a blessing, however, because it 
makes it clear, at a glance, that interpretation is sensitive to end-point selection. Looking 
at their Figure 3 (p.8), if one starts with the very fi rst LFS, earnings of informal economy 
workers appear to increase from about R500 per month (in 2000 prices) in February 
2000 to about R900 in September 2005. Real earnings in September 2000, however, 
look as though they were about R800 per month. They dip (inexplicably?) to about R600 
per month in February 2001, only to climb again. This erratic behaviour undermines 
the validity out of their claim that “the earnings of the self-employed have been steadily 
increasing” (2006, p.8). Real earnings of the self-employed show a more substantial 
increase, possibly from about R1900 to about R2500 between September 2000 and 
September 2004 (2006, Figure 4, p.9). These folk, however, are unlikely to have been 
numbered among the poor in the fi rst place, so are not of great interest to us. A similar 
conclusion holds for workers in the formal sector, where average earnings rise from about 
R2700 to R2800 per month between September 2000 and September 2004 (2006, Figure 
5, p.10). African workers in the formal sector see their average real earnings rise from 
about R1800 to R2000 per month between September 2000 and September 2004 (2006, 
Figure 8, p.12). Average earnings of the unskilled show precious little change over the 
period September 2000 and September 2004 (2006, Figure 10, p.13), possibly rising from 
about R900 in 2000 to R1000 in 2004.
There is little in all of this to encourage the belief that rising real incomes contributed 
much to the decline in the poverty headcount asserted by van der Berg et al to have taken 
place between 2000 and 2004. If employment of lower skilled workers fell, or was static, 
as the fi gures in Table 11 in Meth (2006b) suggest (and as one would expect in a time of 
high and rising unemployment), there would be even less reason to believe that any part 
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of the asserted headcount fall was due to income increases. In short, the case for poverty 
reduction of the magnitude they claim comes to rest on social grants.
e. Social Grants
Without social grants, it is safe to say, conditions among the poor would have been dire 
indeed. The grants appear to have lifted about 1.7 million people over the poverty line in 
2001 (and brought many others below it, closer to the line). By 2004, rapid expansion in 
the number of grants made, raised the number released from poverty to about 3.2 million. 
So, although there was a large increase in the number of social grants, the increase 
was not enough to lift more than an additional 1.3 million-1.5 million or so people out of 
poverty.
While the increase in social grant expenditure (in partial fulfilment of the State’s 
constitutional obligations) is to be welcomed, the poverty gap in rand terms in 2004 was 
still some R35 billion per annum in 2004. This sounds, and is, a large sum of money to 
redistribute each year. It was, however, less than three per cent of GDP in 2004 – that 
is what it would take to eradicate income poverty, if some way of delivering it (with near 
perfect targeting) could be found.
Three grants, as we noted above, do most of the work: the old age pension, child support 
grants and disability grants. It is important to bear in mind that none of these is intended 
to meet the needs of the unemployed, although, through the process known as benefi t 
dilution, the unemployed almost certainly share this source of income. Old age pensions 
have the greatest impact on poverty. In 2004, the approximately two million pensions 
raised about 1.5 million people in 600 000 households over the poverty line.
Five million child support grants look as though they lifted about 900 000 people in 
150 000 households out of poverty. In terms of the numbers of benefi ciaries, the grant 
with the largest increase was the child support grant. This had a relatively limited effect on 
the numbers living below the poverty line, however, because of the small size of the CSG,
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and because many of the households into which the grants fl ow are so very poor, having 
no other sources of income (which implies, of course, that the grants are well targeted).70
Next in importance to these two is the disability grant. Estimating its impact poses serious 
problems. Since most of the recipients of disability grants are poor, it is appropriate to 
allocate most of the money paid out in the form of disability grants to a reduction of the 
poverty gap. The same cannot be said about headcounts. This is because, as noted 
above, the costs of meeting the special needs of the disabled are not known with any 
precision. The degree to which the grant lifts them (and the households in which they are 
located) out of poverty, cannot, therefore, be determined.
Up until recently, the number claiming disability grants (and foster care grants) spiralled 
rapidly upwards, a wholly predictable consequence of (a) the AIDS epidemic, and (b) 
the yawning gap in South Africa’s social protection system. Apart from the few hundred 
thousand reached (each for a short while) by the EPWP, there is effectively no social 
protection for the working age population. As a consequence, the number of disability 
grants paid grew from 613 000 in April 2002 to 694 000 in April 2002, and then to 1.27 
million in April 2004 (IGFR, 2004, Table 6.14, p.76). One of the important explanations of 
this, according to Delany et al (2005) is poverty and unemployment. In one of the areas in 
which the study conducted in-depth interviews, it was reported that:
“the disability grant is viewed as ‘igrant yokuhlupheka’ or ‘the 
grant for the poor people’, both by the general public and some 
involved in the assessment process.” (2005, Section 6.2.2.1)
a perception that is by no means limited to that particular locality. So bad was poverty 
that the study (by CASE) found evidence of the desperate decision by sick people to 
sacrifi ce their health (remain ill) in exchange for the grant. Given government’s concern 
70 The poverty-reducing effects of the child support grant are moderated by what appears to be fairly large scale abuse of the 
system by households at the upper end of the income distribution. The 2005 GHS suggests that among a total of 5.8 million 
grants disbursed, 444 000 went into households where monthly expenditure was between R5000-9999, and a further 180 000 
into households where income exceeded R10 000 per month (own calculations on GHS 2005 data set, correction for income 
under-reporting of 75 per cent was used, and income from all sources, except migrant remittances was taken into account). 
Since 2005, government has taken active steps to combat benefit fraud (see below), so it may be that the GHS is picking up 
the results of these malpractices before the crackdown began. At any event, the fraud makes that other chestnut ‘young girls 
falling pregnant simply to claim the child support grant’ (a conservative favourite) pale into insignificance, as well it should. From 
fieldwork conducted between February and July 2005, de Koker et al (2006, Vol. 3, p.658) found that less than five per cent of 
child support grant claimants were aged less than 21 years, effectively giving the lie to the rumour of hordes of teenagers rushing
to claim the grant.
DPRU Working Paper 07/123
               52
with ‘perverse incentives’ in the social grant system, fi nding ways to halt the growth in 
the number of successful applications for disability benefi ts was obviously a matter that 
exercised the minds of those whose job it is to act on such things. Control seems to 
have been regained, presumably by tightening up (and medicalising) the assessment 
procedures (Nattrass, 2006, p.7).71  By March 2006 the number of disability grant 
beneficiaries had stabilised at about 2.13 million (Plaatjies, 2006, Slide 6). If trends 
observed up until 2004 had continued into the future, disability grants would have 
overtaken the old age pensions in terms of numbers in a few years. That would have 
made a substantial contribution to poverty reduction. The threat (likelihood?) of such an 
outcome appears, at least for the meanwhile to have been averted, albeit at potentially 
very high cost (Nattrass, 2006, p.7). Although the rapid growth in the numbers of disability 
grants undoubtedly made an increasing contribution to the reduction in poverty, it is 
nevertheless still not appropriate to assume that the grants succeeded in eliminating 
poverty in all of the households into which they fl owed. The special needs of many of the 
disabled must have gone unmet in the face of the extreme poverty of the households in 
which they lived.
71 Minister Skweyiya (of the national Department of Social Development) was reported as stating that more than 20 per cent of 
disability grants were obtained fraudulently. See Mail & Guardian online, 5 May 2005, in the article by Donwald Pressly headed 
“Ninety thousand confess to welfare grant fraud”. The article refers as well to the 41 000 public servants in receipt of grants, all 
of whom were being investigated.
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 5. Conclusion
Stories about poverty and unemployment in South Africa differ, depending on who is telling 
them. Differences of interpretation are less easily justifi ed in the case of unemployment, 
than they are in the case of poverty. Government appears not to have much faith in 
the ‘official’ figures gathered by the biannual Labour Force Surveys.72  No less a 
personage than the President himself, as we have seen, prefers the appearance of casual 
observation (the non-appearance of ‘… at least 4 million South Africans walking about in 
our villages, our towns and cities “actively looking for work” ’) to the essence portrayed 
by the LFSs. Social commentators are, of course, perfectly at liberty to reject the LFS 
fi ndings – they may do so on the basis of casual empiricism; they could turn to surveys 
like the AMPS,73 or even, as some have, to proxies like the Unemployment Insurance 
Fund records. If they do not do that, they then discover that apart from the odd lapse, the 
(revised)74 LFSs tell a fairly coherent tale.75  That tale does not accord with government’s 
oft-repeated claim that (one of the causes of) the continuing unemployment problem is 
the ‘fact’ that the rate of growth of the numbers of economically active, exceeds that of the 
working age population.76  Everybody knows that the unemployment problem is serious 
– nobody can say for certain why it is so bad. Taking refuge in a mistaken interpretation of 
events between 1996 and 2005 contributes nothing to its solution. Nor does repetition of 
the slogan ‘we are on track to halve unemployment by 2014’ – careful analysis suggests 
that there is little basis, other than faith, to underpin this assertion – there are simply too 
many unknowns to permit statements of this sort to be made with confi dence (Meth, 2004; 
2006c).
Unemployment is difficult to measure, employment more so. Poverty measurement, 
however, is in a league of its own. Surprisingly, given the fact that poverty eradication 
(or at least, poverty alleviation) is one of government’s most important goals, no national 
72 The rejection of ‘official’ poverty estimates in South Africa (Statistics South Africa, 2002) was even more emphatic. It is ironic
that the poverty estimates that currently enjoy favour at the highest political level are generated from ‘unofficial’ (private sector)
data.
73 The economic activity question in the 2004 AMPS (Question PD2) asks; “Which one of these statements best describes your 
working life?”  Respondents are offered the options of working full-time or working part-time. If they are not working, they 
are invited to select among ‘housewife’, ‘student’, ‘retired’ or ‘unemployed’. This simplicity contrasts strongly with the LFS 
questionnaires. The quality of the information collected in the AMPS is anybody’s guess.
74 See statistical release P0210, 26 September 2005, and subsequent LFSs.
75  About the October Household Surveys, it is less easy to be sure.
76 It is only possible to tell this story if one willfully ignores the obvious break between the OHS series, which ends in 1999, and the 
LFS series, which commences in 2000.
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survey, specifi cally dedicated to the task of measuring poverty (and inequality) has been 
conducted since the dawn of democracy. Academics interested in the subject have thus 
had to make do with whatever has been available.77  Both my results (Meth 2006a; 2006b) 
and those of van der Berg et al (2005) are further instances of academics ‘making-do’. As 
noted above, the decision by van der Berg and his co-authors to make use of the AMPS 
data is bold and innovative. Such are the uncertainties of their methodology, however, that 
their results should be regarded as tentative and exploratory, rather than authoritative. 
The political attractiveness of the results, unfortunately, is such that important users in 
government have shown themselves incapable of resisting the allure of fi gures that say 
what they, the users, want to hear. How much these users were emboldened by the 
way in which van der Berg et al put out their results is not easy to say. The results have 
enjoyed extensive coverage in the press, on the radio and on television. Here is the way 
in which their paper’s abstract presents the fi ndings:
“To steer clear of an unduly optimistic conclusion, assumptions are chosen 
that would tend to show the least decline in poverty. Whilst there were no 
strong trends in poverty for the period 1995 to 2000, both data series show 
a considerable decline in poverty after 2000, particularly in the period 2002-
2004. Poverty dominance testing shows that this decline is independent of 
the poverty line chosen or whether the poverty headcount, the poverty ratio 
or the poverty severity ratio are used as measure. We fi nd likely explanations 
for this strong and robust decline in poverty in the massive expansion of the 
social grant system as well as possibly in improved job creation in recent 
years.”  (van der Berg et al, 2005, p.2, emphasis added)
Using the LFSs as primary data source, my calculations suggest that not only are 
headcounts likely to have been higher than van der Berg et al suggest, but also that the 
fall in poverty was likely to have been much smaller. The LFSs appear as well, to suggest 
that ‘improved job creation’ played little or no role in such reduction of poverty as did 
occur. My results are tentative, because of the numerous obstacles that have had to be 
surmounted. That said, the LFSs (whatever other shortcomings as data sources they 
may have), do allow the poverty question to be addressed, almost independently, from 
both the income and the expenditure sides. This is a strong point in their favour. Because 
77 A few surveys attempt to gather data in smaller jurisdictions, the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study, being a notable 
example.
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the surveys collect data on both income and expenditure, it is possible to use simple 
imputation to reduce missing or implausible fi gures on either side to a minimum. To the 
extent that it is able, the 2004 GHS, which also collects income and expenditure data, 
offers some support to the conclusions generated by the LFS.
Painless, the process of extracting poverty information from offi cial statistics, certainly is 
not. A great deal of guesswork (some of it educated, some of it less so) has to be done. 
Similar strictures apply to van der Berg and his colleagues – like the rest of us, they are 
forced to make a variety of assumptions to compensate for defi ciencies in the data they 
use. This means that the quality of all of our (guess) estimates leaves more than a little 
to be desired. In short, there is much work to be done, and a number of problems to 
be solved before any of the household surveys conducted in South Africa is capable of 
yielding more precise poverty estimates.
Since precision remains tantalizingly out of reach, the ‘actual’ headcount and the 
true magnitude of the poverty gap, and the ways that these have changed in recent 
years, must remain a matter for conjecture. This has implications for the way that all 
of us (producers and users of information about poverty) should behave. As poverty 
researchers, we must make the caveats that apply to all of our work so prominent that 
nobody can ever miss them. We should refrain from the unjustifi able use of words like 
‘robust’, when ‘fragile’ and ‘tentative’ are more apposite. The spurious accuracy of single 
point estimates is to be avoided – all of the results from my work are approximations 
– in each case, they lie within a range, whose width, unfortunately, it is not very easy 
to estimate. Neither my results nor those of van der Berg et al are ‘facts’ – they are 
possibilities. That is the spirit in which they should be used.
Although one can (and should) attempt to prescribe the way in which one’s research 
fi ndings may be used, limiting the ways in which users actually deploy them once they 
are in the public domain, is not possible. Even if politicians, for example, were inclined 
to read ‘directions for use’, it is not obvious that they have much incentive to heed them. 
This could be so for many reasons. Often, they address audiences with notoriously 
short attention spans, among whom caveats would go unheard. Politicians impelled, 
either by inclination or necessity, to advance particular agendas (as part, for example, 
of the imperative of attempting to show that justice has been done), are also likely to 
ignore or downplay the fragility of research results. The only protection citizens have 
against this is a vigilant and well-informed press, able to dispel myth or self-serving 
assertion wherever they fi nd it. This leads back to the uncomfortable conclusion that when 
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academics engage in research in highly sensitive areas, they have to forsake the comfort 
of the ivory tower where arcane matters are normally settled (or not, as the case may be 
– as one economist quipped, some debates in the discipline drone on for centuries) for a 
cockpit in full view of a (probably) partisan public. Oh dear!
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